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Abstract
The paper uses non-experimental longitudinal data to study the effects of participa-
tion in the Youth Guarantee programme aimed at fighting youth inactivity in the 
European Union territory. Particularly, this analysis questions the value of active 
labour market policy as a valid instrument to help individuals otherwise isolated 
from the labour market and, thus, at risk of deterioration of human capital over-
come their condition of occupational inactivity. A difference-in-differences model 
is exploited in this regard to investigate whether there exists an advantage for par-
ticipants of the Youth Guarantee in terms of employment and job stability. Results 
show that participants are 7.4 and 4.4 percentage points more likely to, respectively, 
become employed and be offered an open-ended contract. An assessment of profil-
ing is also provided.
Keywords Active labour market policy · Difference-in-differences · European 
Union · Flexicurity · NEET · Profiling · Training · Youth Guarantee · Youth 
unemployment
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Youth is the best time to be rich, and the best time to be poor.
Euripides, 416 b.C.
1 Introduction
Countries within the European Union are diverse as regards institutional and social 
characteristics and economic aspects, with many of them still not taking action 
against structural problems such as youth unemployment. Following the 92/2012 
Fornero Law and the 183/2014 Jobs Act, for instance, temporary contracts tripled 
in Italy as they became cheaper for firms. As a result, part-time contracts reached 
64% of the total in 2015 and left the majority of the young population with jobs last-
ing less than 6 months.1 Not even the facilitated transition from education to work 
promoted by the German dual training system2 or the social investment approach in 
Sweden reversed the trend of the youth inactivity rate, which in the European Union 
reached 33 million in 2012. For this reason, on 22 April 2013 the Council of the 
European Union recommended an ad hoc strategy, defined as the Youth Guarantee, 
and provided additional funds to member states with extremely high youth unem-
ployment rates.3 The policy was set in favour of one of the targets of the Europe 
2020 strategy; namely, individuals aged between 15 and 24  years not in employ-
ment, not in education, and not in training (NEETs). The Council recommended the 
Youth Guarantee to fight youth inactivity and to provide them with ‘a good quality 
offer of employment, continued education, an apprenticeship or a traineeship within 
a period of 4 months of becoming unemployed or leaving formal education’.4 This 
study aims to understand the effect of the Youth Guarantee implemented in North-
ern Italy, specifically in the Province of Trento, at the individual level in terms of 
increased job opportunities. In particular, it represents one of the first econometric 
studies to focus on an active labour market policy (ALMP), the Youth Guarantee, 
that is acknowledged at the international level and that, therefore, affects the entirety 
of the member states of the European Union (EU) from a regulatory and practical 
viewpoint. Additionally, it is one of the first studies to provide policy implications 
that address the issue of NEETs in Europe by analysing occupationally inactive indi-
viduals in a normally developed area of Italy.
Except for Scandinavia, the rest of Europe is renowned for its focus on passive 
measures. Hence, the Youth Guarantee represents one of the milestones reached in 
legislative history in terms of active labour market policies, which aim to help the 
unemployed community find a job. They do so by offering classroom or on-the-job 
training, subsidised employment, or job search assistance. Since the 1990s, ALMPs 
1 See Cirillo et al. (2017).
2 See Albert et al. in Schömann and O’Connell (2002).
3 For instance, Spain and Italy.
4 Council of the European Union, 2013.
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have made incentives available for individuals to stay active for a present reward; 
namely, to keep their subsidies or to obtain participation monetary awards. They 
have provided the same incentives to individuals for a future reward too; namely, 
to upgrade their skills and, therefore, increase their chances to find not only a job, 
but a good one. This concept has been in place since the twentieth century. Scoville 
(1969), for instance, was one of the first scholars to stress that the broader the train-
ing individuals experience, the better individuals are situated when confronted with 
economic or technological changes. In other words, active measures are expected to 
provide disadvantaged individuals with better occupational or educational opportu-
nities. The Youth Guarantee is particular in that it exclusively targets the younger 
population. It also represents a change of direction in respect to the more tradition-
alist assistance systems typical of certain European regions. On the other hand, the 
issue of NEETs is a problem shared by both Northern and Southern Europe.5 It 
explains why the European Union invested substantial amounts of money in a policy 
that is, firstly, active and, secondly, targeted for the young population. In this paper, 
in particular, we investigate whether an active policy such as the one recommended 
by the European Union can succeed in helping governments fight youth inactivity. 
We do so by looking at the likelihood of participants to become employed after hav-
ing taken part in the programme. The analysis focuses on Northern Italy and particu-
larly on the Province of Trento for a series of reasons: namely, the accuracy of the 
data provided by the Agency of Labour and their leading national role in designing 
active labour market policies; their compliance with the European Union’s require-
ment of timing and funding of the training programmes; and their socioeconomic 
similarity with other European countries like Austria, one of the pioneers of youth 
policies, and like Denmark, with which they share the organisational structure of the 
job centres.
In regard to the literature, the use of passive labour market policies in Italy,6 has 
driven the development of extensive theoretical and empirical written work. The ten-
dency to switch resources from passive to active programmes, however, has brought 
policy-makers to question the effectiveness of training programmes interested in 
upgrading the skills of the individuals rather than to just grant them monetary subsi-
dies.7 While empirical studies on youth unemployment remedies are scarce for Italy, 
a large number of descriptive reports on the most recent labour laws are produced at 
both regional and national levels. The Institute for the Evaluative Research of Public 
Policies (IRVAPP), for instance, has published accounts and statistics on the Italian 
Garanzia Giovani since its implementation, while Vesan and Lizzi (2017) recently 
analysed the institutional and political dynamics behind it within the new policy 
5 The financial contribution expected from all the member states of the European Union to fight youth 
unemployment makes the management and impact of the Youth Guarantee of relevance for both the 
poorest and the richest countries in the Community.
6 In 2015, public expenditure on passive and active measures was, respectively, equal to € 21 billion and 
to € 6.8 billion in Italy.
7 The latter are not always fruitful for their recipients. In Australia, reducing childcare expenditure 
through monetary benefits increased the labour supply of the parents only by 0.75 to 1 h per week. See 
Guest and Parr (2013).
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design framework. Our paper, on the other hand, uses a difference-in-differences 
model and provides one of the first econometric evaluations of the most recent Euro-
pean active labour market policy. In particular, it attempts to answer the question of 
whether active labour market policies can work in countries like Italy where young 
individuals are usually the first ones to be fired and the last ones to be hired.8 The 
issue of youth inactivity is addressed by investigating the occupational outcome of 
the individuals in respect to their probability to become employed and their prob-
ability to be offered an open-ended and, thus, stable contract. While the issue of 
youth unemployment is typical of the whole European Union territory, job instabil-
ity is particularly pronounced in the flexinsecure regions of the South due to their 
institutional background.9 The relevance of the study, therefore, is twofold. First, 
any finding in respect to occupational propensity is of interest to other neighbour-
ing Italian and European regions such as Austria or Denmark that share institutional 
features with the Province of Trento in terms of social assistance and approach fight-
ing youth inactivity. Second, while it is inappropriate to draw conclusions for Italy 
as a whole due to its particular historical nature, the paper aims to investigate the 
possibility to overcome an issue that affects the young population and that is typi-
cally Italian; namely, flexinsecurity and, thus, job instability. The reference to the 
Province of Trento (PT) is also significant in that it is nationally renowned for an 
expertise in the field of ALMP, which implies any policy recommendations for the 
PT could be of use for the less prepared Italian regions.
Overall, the study tries to understand whether commitment to such a policy is 
worth it on both the aspects of employment and job stability. In other words, it ques-
tions whether one can really ‘reap’ a job from what one sows; namely, the skills 
acquired by committing to a training programme. To do so, a difference-in-differ-
ences model is exploited to compare participating and non-participating individuals 
throughout the years. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the lit-
erature on active labour market policies. Section 3 introduces the institutional back-
ground in which the Youth Guarantee is implemented, with particular reference to 
the Italian labour market. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy used; namely a 
difference-in-differences strategy. Due to the difficulty of Italian institutions to col-
lect sensible data with respect to the Youth Guarantee, we are not allowed to test 
its parallel trends assumption in the standard way. A valid alternative is, however, 
provided in the paper. Section 5 describes the data analysed and provides some sta-
tistics. Section 6 discusses the relative results and robustness checks, while Sect. 7 
concludes with policy implications. An in-depth analysis on profiling is presented in 
the “Appendix”.
8 See Andor and Veselý (2018).
9 See Sect. 3.
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2  Literature review
Since the 1990s, scholars have investigated both the macroeconomic and micro-
economic consequences of, respectively, investing in active labour market poli-
cies and participating in such measures. Findings are mixed, as are the objectives 
of the single policies. The general hope is for active measures to make individu-
als more adaptable to the labour market and, thus, develop a degree of commit-
ment towards becoming employed that also makes them more attractive to firms. 
Scholars have long debated over the impact of ALMPs on the aggregate economy, 
including their effect on wages, unemployment, and participation in the labour 
market. According to Katz (1994), ALMPs have a positive influence on economic 
growth and equity over the medium term, with active re-employment systems 
having a comparative advantage over simple income maintenance. In support 
of this theory, Boeri and Burda (1996) argued that active labour market policies 
decreased structural unemployment and, thus, contributed to the Czech economic 
miracle. Similarly, Altavilla and Caroleo (2018) highlighted the role played by 
internal shocks in the Italian economy but believed in the power of active meas-
ures to increase labour force participation. On the other hand, while ALMPs 
might decrease unemployment they are also likely to reduce regular employment. 
This is especially true when entitlement to unemployment benefits is conditional 
to participation in such measures. Calmfors et al. (2002) reached this conclusion 
for Sweden. In relation to the negative effects of ALMPs, the study by Estevao 
(2003) argues that active labour market policies increase competition in the job 
market but that they, too, reduce real wages. This has also been found by Berge-
mann et  al. (2009) for Germany. Scholars have disagreed, as well, on what the 
preferred environment for the implementation of ALMPs should be. In fact, the 
effectiveness of ALMPs depends as well on the economic condition of the coun-
try in which they are implemented. Studies by Calmfors et  al. (2002) and Dar 
and Tzannatos (1999) show that active measures usually lead to higher returns in 
times of economic stability. Conversely, the analysis by Card et al. (2011, 2010) 
points out how employers are more drawn towards hiring participants of ALMPs 
in times when the market does not work well.
Mixed results have led governments to question the capability of ALMPs to 
address issues related to unemployment. Scholars usually agree on the fundamen-
tal role played by labour market institutions in developing national active meas-
ures. In their study, Kazepov and Ranci (2016) noted that, while there certainly is 
no shortage of strong trade unions, the lack of coordination between social part-
ners generally leads to low social investment in Italy. Indeed, where the density 
of unions is high, outsiders such as the long-term unemployed are unlikely to 
be supported. This paper is in agreement with previous findings such as Nick-
ell’s (1997), which stressed the difficulty of reaching high levels of flexibility 
in the labour markets of Southern Europe due to high unionisation. Similarly, 
Svejnar (2002) associated the lower rigidity of the Polish and Hungarian labour 
markets to lower union density, compared to other Central and East European 
countries. The same argument has also been brought by Howell et al. (2007) in 
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their cross-country assessment. It seems, indeed, that rather than because of their 
political ideology, governments decide to support investments in active measures 
as they seek electoral support. The study by Rueda (2006), for instance, high-
lighted the importance for social democratic governments to satisfy the inter-
ests of insiders rather than of employment itself. This has also been proved by 
Mechtel and Potrafke (2013) for Germany. It goes without saying that institutions 
have the power to influence state spending in ALMPs. According to van Vliet 
and Koster (2011), spending on ALMPs tends to be higher in countries where 
there are tripartite and coordinated councils, with debates from the members of 
the government, the trade unions, and the associations of employers. Conversely, 
underinvestment in ALMPs is often the result of fiscal free riding by countries 
that share borders, as argued by Franzese and Hays (2006). These are the coun-
tries that benefit from trained individuals but that are not interested in investing in 
their education and skills at the national level. The aforementioned issues suggest 
the importance of studying the aggregate effectiveness of ALMPs without ignor-
ing the institutional background of the country under investigation.
Institutional constraints, for instance, make life difficult for ALMPs in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia (ECA). According to a study by Kuddo (2009), they often 
cause both bad networking between private providers, firms, and the unemployment 
centres, and understaffing of the public employment services, with cases of single 
caseworkers in ECA regions having to deal with 1200 unemployed subjects. More 
flexible states, on the other hand, allow for quasi-competitive mechanisms where 
multiple providers compete to offer the best service, as described by Martin and 
Grubb (2001) and Lindqvist and Westman (2011) for Australia and Switzerland. 
States affect the impact of ALMPs also by the level of workfare and the enabling 
elements they decide to implement, according to Dingeldey (2007). Denmark, for 
instance, offers universal assistance to citizens; favours the local administration of 
labour market policies; invests in job rotation schemes and day-care institutions for 
families; and promotes the co-existence of public services and private agencies. In 
the words of Cox (1998), it admits a greater role of the state and makes the latter 
responsible for the enforcement of both rights and duties. Countries like Japan, on 
the other hand, do not need active policy in excess as they invest in ex-ante threat 
effects with strict eligibility conditions for benefits and social assistance. According 
to Martin (2015), the latter explains why individuals are strongly encouraged to find 
a job. A similar conclusion can be drawn for developing countries such as India and 
Ethiopia, where the mere existence of such active programmes are sufficient to create 
placebo effects that motivate individuals. The study by Mckenzie (2017) proves that, 
rather than being threatened, these disadvantaged individuals gain more confidence 
and, as a consequence, are more likely to commit to find a job. Indeed, ALMPs 
often have effects on behaviours that are not necessarily related to the labour market. 
Through active measures and together with labour market institutions, governments 
are able to solve internal social issues as well. ALMPs help, for instance, fight social 
exclusion. In accordance with this theory, Anderson (2009) observed how ALMPs 
succeed in increasing ties between insiders, such as the older and protected work-
ers, and outsiders, such as the temporary and younger job candidates. Sarvimäki and 
Hämäläinen (2016), on the other hand, found that restructuring ALMPs significantly 
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increases immigrants’ earnings in Finland. Additionally, ALMPs can help states 
overcome crime. A study by Bertrand and Crépon (2017) on Latin America high-
lights how skills training programmes do not always aim to increase employment 
but might as well be focused on reducing criminal activities. On this subject, the 
analysis by Fallesen et al. (2006) emphasises the association between participation 
in active labour market policies and reduction in men’s propensity to commit crime, 
independent of their unemployment insurance condition. Overall, scholars usually 
agree on the concept of Caliendo and Schmidl (2016) that ALMPs should also guar-
antee social support. In effect, those who have been unlucky in the labour market 
are usually also unskilled in social interactions. ALMPs, then, may help overcome 
Katz’s (1994) ‘secession of the successful’.
Interestingly, much of the effectiveness of ALMPs regards the design and the aim 
of the programmes themselves. According to Bonoli (2010), active measures usu-
ally have four objectives: namely, incentive reinforcement, which is widely exploited 
in Italy; employment assistance, typical of the Scandinavian countries; occupation, 
usually supported by christian communities; and human capital investment, which is 
the reason ALMPs were born as industries started expanding in the 1960s. Whether 
individuals should participate in an active measure and what type of programme 
they should choose are two issues that are still highly debated by scholars. Most 
agree with Acemoglu and Autor (2012), according to whom more educated workers 
should be paid a larger salary anyway due to the surplus they bring into the firm in 
terms of human capital. There are, on the other hand, scholars like O’Higgins (2001) 
who believe in ALMPs being effective for the individual’s skills only insofar the 
measures are actually interdependent. The nature of ALMPs varies and individuals 
cannot always experience the wide range of available programmes. Training, how-
ever, appears to be the most effective active measure according to most of the exist-
ing studies. In this regard, a study by Meager (2008) defined job training as the most 
successful measure at the aggregate level. Katz (1994), too, recognised the property 
of training to reduce the salary gap between high- and low-skilled individuals. Con-
firmation of the hypothesis came also from Card et al. (2011, 2010) who showed the 
larger gains produced by human capital accumulation compared to other labour mar-
ket measures. According to Saniter and Siedler (2014), for instance, internships are 
to be considered ‘door openers’ in Germany for individuals with low orientation in 
the labour market, as they increase wage returns by 6%. Positive effects for on-the-
job training were also presented in the studies by Bonnal et al. (1997), who observed 
better matching effects for the less educated young workers, and by Escudero (2018). 
Stephan (2008) reached the same conclusion for East Germany. According to the lat-
ter, employment opportunities were higher for participants in firm-internal training 
programmes. Undoubtedly, and as argued by Brown and Koettl (2015) as well, train-
ing programmes are more effective the nearer they are to regular jobs. On the other 
hand, vocational training can also be beneficial for individuals. This was detected, 
for instance, by Hujer et al. (2006) for participants in West Germany. The advantage 
of such measure is that it allows individuals to compensate for a more severe lack of 
human capital. In the developing countries studied by Mckenzie (2017), vocational 
training is even considered an effective substitute for schooling to build human 
capital. An analysis by Budría and P.T. (2008) for the Madeira Island also showed 
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that training could compensate for a lack in education. In particular, training pro-
grammes that are similar to schooling generally offer positive signaling to employers 
according to Caliendo and Schmidl (2016).
By contrast, scholars usually agree on the ineffectiveness of other types of 
ALMPs. On this subject, Fertig et  al. (2002) shed light on the negative conse-
quences of spending in public employment programmes. In support of this theory, 
Kuddo (2009) highlighted the possibility of public employment to cause social 
stigma in Poland. Caliendo et al. (2011a), too, defined public work in Germany as 
being harmful in both short and medium terms and ineffective in the long term, as 
Martin and Grubb (2001) previously demonstrated for the OECD countries. Other 
programmes fail to bring unemployed individuals back to work. A study by Doerr 
et al. (2016) stressed the potential locking-in effects of vouchers in Germany, as did 
Biewen et  al. (2014) for other public-sponsored programmes and Caliendo et  al. 
(2011b) years before. Using matching estimators, Ichino et  al. (2008) evaluated 
the effects of temporary work agency jobs. Findings were positive in occupational 
terms for Italy. However, those who were assigned help jobs in the U.S. had actually 
lower chances to find a permanent job later on. Similar conclusions were reached 
by Lechner and Wunsch (2009) for job creation schemes in East Germany. In par-
ticular, the programmes failed to increase employment chances for participants in 
the long term. Training itself can have unexpectedly negative effects. Its impact on 
unemployment duration was declared insignificant in a study on France by Crépon 
et al. (2010). Both training and job creation reduced the chances of finding a job in 
Sweden according to an analysis by Fredriksson and Johansson (2008). The pro-
grammes also increased the locking-in effects of participants. Certainly, all types of 
programmes have pessimistic effects if misused. In the young population’s case, for 
instance, there are often many individuals who become ‘eternal interns’. In Germany 
and Italy, Cerulli-Harms (2017) found an average treatment effect for internships 
on employment chances of, respectively, -7.4% and -2.6%. In the same way, there 
are many individuals who simply accommodate to their unemployment condition, as 
synthesised by Crépon and van den Berg (2016).
All in all, although being the most expensive ALMPs, training is considered by 
many to be the best active measure. This is particularly true for the younger popu-
lation, with generally little work experience behind them. As stressed by Boone 
and van Ours (2009), training might not succeed in accelerating the transition 
from unemployment to employment, but it certainly helps individuals increase 
the quality of their future jobs by making them able to distinguish between a good 
and a bad occupation. Despite this, there are still many individuals whose cog-
nitive ability acquired during the programmes proves not sufficient to exit from 
their unemployment condition. This is shown by both Heckman et al. (2006) and 
Lindqvist and Westman (2011) for, respectively, the U.S. and Sweden. Much 
of what is achieved through ALMPs depends on what specific target the vari-
ous programmes focus on. Disadvantaged subjects such as women, who usually 
have fewer opportunities in the labour market and experience a greater distance 
from it compared to men, usually benefit more from ALMPs. Higher returns for 
women, for instance, are presented in the work of both Svejnar (1999), Berge-
mann and van den Berg (2008), and Card et al. (2011, 2010). Women often have 
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to compromise personal decisions such as starting a family too, in order to accept 
a job offer. Fertility rates, for instance, tend to be negatively influenced by the 
closure of firms according to a study on Austria by Del Bono et al. (2014). On 
the other hand, Lechner and Wiehler (2011) observed how ALMPs made women 
postpone their pregnancies in this country and increased their attachment to the 
labour force. The study by Caliendo and Künn (2015), too, encourages women to 
exploit start-up subsidies to coordinate family and work life. Similar arguments 
are debated when comparing groups of individuals who differ because of age. 
While sanctions might not be effective for older cohorts in terms of increasing 
their participation in the labour market, they work well for young individuals 
according to Stephan (2008). According to Heckman (2000), for instance, train-
ing programmes are inefficient for adult men or older displaced workers, while 
they produce some benefits for the youth. On this subject, the scholar stressed 
the positive outcomes from the programmes of the Big Brothers/Big Sisters of 
America, the Philadelphia Futures’ Sponsor-A-Scholar, and the Quantum Oppor-
tunity Program for disadvantaged minority students. In addition, he referred to 
the positive results obtained for the participants of the Ohio’s Learning, Earn-
ing, and Parenting programme, the Teenage Parent Demonstration, and the New 
Chance Program for young parents lacking basic skills. As regards the Jobstart 
programme, this also proved beneficial for vulnerable young individuals such as 
high school dropouts and men who had been recently arrested. Therefore, while 
ALMPs might not be successful for the older cohort of workers, they seem to be 
useful for some disadvantaged young categories. In this regard, while Pehkonen 
(1997) found substantial displacement effects of ALMPs for the young Finnish 
population, results were non robust. Caliendo et al. (2011b), too, highlighted the 
heterogeneous effects of ALMPs in Germany. As stressed by O’Higgins (2001), 
young individuals are seldom considered good substitutes for adult workers, 
hence the need to study their issue thoroughly.
Overall, the mixed results presented make it difficult to understand whether 
investing in human capital is always beneficial or whether distinct measures 
should be provided to distinct categories of workers. As regards those individuals 
who are not in employment, nor in education, nor in training, Cammeraat et al. 
(2017) recently studied the Dutch mandatory activation programme Wet Invest-
eren in Jongeren and found that the latter had no significant impact on NEETs. 
The policy neither increased their employment rate nor did it incentivise them to 
go back to their studies or start a training programme. Using matching on covari-
ates, Cappellini et al. (2018) found, instead, positive effects for NEETs in the Ital-
ian region of Tuscany. This paper contributes to the relatively modern literature 
of policy evaluations in the European Union context, by adding empirical support 
to the descriptive studies produced in Italy on youth unemployment remedies. In 
particular, it is one of the first econometric evaluations so far of a programme 
originated from the Youth Guarantee. The considerable financial investment in 
the policy; the vulnerable nature of the participants; and the number of firms 
involved in the entire territory of the European Union justify the need to under-
stand whether it is worth it or not to continue along this ‘active’ path (Table 1).
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3  Institutional background
When looking at the institutional background regulating the labour market, one 
sees that reforms aimed at the creation of a more flexible labour market originated 
shortly before the twenty first century. They started, in particular, with the Pacchetto 
Treu of Law 196/1997; a set of reforms aimed at the promotion of part-time work 
and other atypical forms of contracts such as job-sharing. With respect to forma-
tion, Art. 18 stressed the necessity to ‘[attribute] formative credits for the activities 
carried out during the internships [to start] an employment relationship’. This type 
of implementation continued in the 2000s with the introduction of Law 328/2000 
on social intervention, in which Art. 3 highlighted the importance of ‘active poli-
cies of formation, introductions to work and re-employment’, and of Decree Law 
368/2001, which allowed fixed-term contracts to regular employees. The 30/2003 
Biagi Law further extended the use of temporary work agencies with the Legislative 
Decree 276/2003. Art. 2, in particular, rigorously defined both the employment ser-
vices associated to these agencies and the parties involved so as to ‘ameliorate the 
ability of occupational integration of those who are unemployed or [first-time job 
seekers]’.10 Importantly, the decree also stressed the financial and juridical requisites 
of the employment agencies, as well as their due objective; namely, to serve as an 
intermediary and support reinstatement.11 The latter was supposed to be put into 
practice through ‘active and workfare policies’.12 Nonetheless, after Italian legisla-
tion tried to fight the existing mismatch of skills with more flexible institutions, the 
security of workers started to stagger.
In 2012, when polarisation between high and low skills was reaching its peak in 
Europe, the Italian Art. 18 of Law 300/1970, for instance, was amended. The for-
mer established that ‘the judge [would] order the entrepreneur or non-entrepreneur 
employer to reintegrate the worker into the workplace, regardless of the formal rea-
son given and regardless of the number of employees employed by the employer’.13 
Undoubtedly, this reduced the protection of workers in the case of layoffs deemed as 
invalid by the court. The subsequent Jobs Act of 2014 further aggravated the posi-
tion of such individuals. On the one hand, its Art. 1 established the implementation 
of a specific National Employment Agency for the encouragement of active labour 
market policies and the ‘promotion of a link between the income support measures 
for the inactive or unemployed person and the measures dedicated to its integra-
tion in the productive fabric’.14 On the other hand, the Jobs Act cancelled Art. 18 of 
Law 300/1970 as a whole and replaced the reinstatement right with mere monetary 
compensation.15 Also due to the Italian productive structure characterised by small 
13 See Art. 18 (c. 1) of Law 300/1970.
14 See Art. 1 (c. 4p) of Law 183/2014.
15 See Art. 1 (c. 7c) of Law 183/2014.
10 See Art. 3 of the Legislative Decree 276/2003.
11 See Art. 4 of the Legislative Decree 276/2003.
12 See Art. 13 of the Legislative Decree 276/2003.
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and micro firms,16 the result in the recent decade, have been low-paid, low-qualified, 
and unprotected flexible jobs that made it difficult for active measures to step in and 
promote permanent employment growth. Indeed, although flexibility is considered 
capable of enhancing access to the labour market and increasing job creation, the 
discrimination of its use may have negative consequences on the more vulnerable 
subjects, including job destruction and little prospect for new job seekers. On this 
subject, Barbieri (2011) stressed how flexicurity, or better ‘flexinsecurity’, affected 
mostly, and negatively, the Italian young population. Not only was the increase in 
non-permanent contracts and, therefore, in reduced employment security not com-
pensated by higher wages, but ‘egoistically privileged generations of rentiers’ out-
raced the younger individuals and deprived them of welfare entitlement.17 The work 
by Berton et al. (2009), for instance, sheds light on how in Italy flexibility necessar-
ily leads to precarity, or job insecurity, with respect to salaries, welfare measures, 
and permanent jobs available. Scholars Biewen et al. (2014), too, argued in favour 
of flexible and entry jobs only insofar they lead to better-paid and more stable jobs. 
The latter is even more emblematic when accounting for the negative impact that 
initial labour market entry conditions can have on job quality and earnings.18 As 
regards further reforms, Art. 1 of the 190/2014 Law introduced the exemption from 
social security contributions paid by employers for each new open-ended contract 
offered, while the 2015–2017 Budgetary Laws granted additional hiring incentives 
in support of permanent contracts. Jessoula et  al. (2010) observed how the ‘secu-
rity plus flexibility’ formula is often applied differently to age groups, with indi-
viduals younger than 24 years suffering the most from the exploitation of fixed-term 
jobs.19 On this subject, there is little Italian young individuals can do for the coun-
try remains one of the few that still lacks a proper national representative body for 
them.20 As observed by Cirillo et al. (2017), the increase in permanent jobs almost 
exclusively regarded the older cohort of workers. In parallel, the younger job seekers 
were left, for the most part, with atypical contracts as the result of a going-flexible 
policy entirely à l’italienne. As former members of the European Commission and 
supporters of the Youth Guarantee, Andor and Veselý (2018) pointed out how it is 
the young people who usually are fired in difficult economic times.
The intervention of the European Union, thus, plays an essential role in bring-
ing not only financial support but also awareness on youth unemployment; on the 
costs that the countries have to bear due to their inactivity; and on the necessity to 
turn to human capital investment. On 22 April 2013 the European Union’s Council 
recommended a Youth Guarantee as part of the Europe 2020 strategy. According to 
the 120/01 Recommendation, countries should make sure that ‘young people receive 
a good-quality offer of employment, continued education, an apprenticeship or a 
16 See Vasta and Di Martino (2017).
17 See Barbieri (2011), pp. 19, 31.
18 See Brunner and Kuhn (2014).
19 With respect to exploiting vulnerable segments of the population, Korkeamäki and Kyyrä (2012) 
showed how employers of growing establishments in Finland tend to take advantage of disability retire-
ment so as not to resort to standard dismissals.
20 See Lenzi et al. (2018) and Acconcia and Graziano (2017).
1 3
European Journal of Law and Economics 
traineeship within a period of 4 months of becoming unemployed or leaving formal 
education’.21 Even if ‘there is also a need for a short-term response to counter the 
dramatic effects of the economic crisis on the labour market’,22 the purpose of this 
Guarantee is to ‘contribute to sustainable and inclusive economic growth’.23 Andor 
and Veselý (2018), in this regard, defined the Youth Guarantee as a structural reform 
that aims to reduce the duration of youth unemployment and their non-participation 
in the labour market. Differently from a regulation, a directive, or a decision, a rec-
ommendation by the institutions of the European Union is not binding from a leg-
islative perspective. Thus, it is up to the member states of the European Union to 
implement the suggestions recommended by the Council in their national jurisdic-
tions. The funds available24 (see Table 5 below) and the increasing number of inac-
tive young people in the country, made it rather reasonable to the Italian government 
to follow the European Union’s instructions. The creation of an Italian Structure of 
Mission, expected by the 99/2013 Law and then transformed into the national body 
ANPAL, or Agenzia Nazionale per le Politiche Attive del Lavoro of the 150/2014 
Law Decree, revealed the prospect of implementing this European reform in the 
country ‘in accordance with national, regional and local circumstances’.25 Accord-
ing to the European Commission, most of the member states responded with rel-
evant policy measures.26 Similarly to Italy, where Regions or independent Provinces 
take care of the unemployed, Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands, too, refer to a 
multi-layered system that involves a series of social partners. Many of the networks 
built by the public employment services (PES) consist of schools and other train-
ing institutions. In Belgium, for instance, students are informed about their oppor-
tunities when and if they register with the PES before leaving school, while Dan-
ish centres help them transition from compulsory school to any activity that could 
come next, both in educational and occupational terms. Austrian trade unions, on 
the other hand, cooperate with the Ministry of Labour for defining training pro-
grammes, while in Germany the private sector contributes to improving vocational 
training together with the Länder and the Government. In the Netherlands, too, net-
works between young candidates and potential employers are strengthened through 
elevator pitches in informal meetings. The incidence of the 120/01 Recommenda-
tion, with the European Union’s institutions that claimed themselves that ‘the Youth 
Guarantee is probably one of the [structural reforms] most rapidly implemented’27 
in Europe; the denomination of the latter as a social right within the European 
21 (5), p. 1 of 2013/C 120/01.
22 (22), p. 3 of 2013/C 120/01.
23 (1), p. 1 of 2013/C 120/01.
24 For Italy equal to € 567 million from the Youth European Initiative, € 567 million from the European 
Social Fund, and an additional 40% of national co-funding, for a total of about € 1513 billion.
25 (1), p. 3 of 2013/C 120/01.
26 The document is available on the website of the European Commission and was drafted in Strasbourg 
on 4 October 2016.
27 On the Commission’s website, such a statement can be found in “The Youth Guarantee country by 
country” section.
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Social Model28; and the fact that all the member states put it into effect explain the 
relevance of this study.
Interestingly, while the Italian government adopted a national normative for 
active policy only in 2014, an administrative body with the same functions already 
existed in the independent Province of Trento, part of the Trentino-Alto Adige 
region and granted a special independence statute since the 1940s. The legislative 
power of this province, which deals, too, with public interventions, social services, 
and the economy, led to a series of reforms that directly affected its population. The 
founding Provincial Law 19/1983, for instance, created a provincial structure ahead 
of its time where administrative, accounting, and management independence are 
combined with a full range of responsibilities in the field of labour policy in the 
Province of Trento. Today, it includes a central structure in Trento and 12 additional 
employment centres spread in the territory. Major objectives of this institution are 
to personalise active labour market policies and give them precedence over pas-
sive measures and to support female29 and youth employment. In this regard, the 
Agency promotes internships; meetings in schools and in the employment centres to 
inform students about the labour market; apprenticeships to understand the business 
needs; mobility abroad services; and generational rotation and qualifying income to, 
respectively, favour hiring via open-ended contracts and enable individuals to ben-
efit from an income support, reduce working hours, and bring them back to their 
studies. Their long-term expertise in the design of active labour market policies is 
also reflected in their compliance with the Council’s requirements in temporal and 
financial terms. In addition to supporting inactive young subjects from a financial 
viewpoint during their on-the-job training, they also provide them with an offer of 
job or training within 4 months from having registered as such, and not within 6 or 
7 months as generally happens for most of the Italian regions. As stressed by the 
aforementioned members of the European Commission ‘a few months of unemploy-
ment or inactivity [for the youth] can have the same damaging effects that are usu-
ally associated with long-term unemployment in older generations’.30 Their socio-
economic similarity to countries that are considered the pioneers of youth policies 
in continental Europe, like Austria, and the organisational structure of its employ-
ment centres, reminiscent of the popular Employment Areas of Denmark focused 
on local employment questions, justify, too, our decision to give precedence to the 
data provided by the Province of Trento (see Table 2). While one should not expect 
Italian generalisations,31 the peculiarity of this area allows us to draw conclusions 
relevant for its Northern neighbouring regions and other similar European regions. 
Thus, the contribution of this study should be intended as particularly significant for 
28 (4b), p. 12, European Pillar of Social Rights.
29 This is relevant when considering the argument by Gaddis and Klasen (2013) according to which 
female labour force participation is more likely to increase due to local conditions and institutions rather 
than secular trends.
30 Andor and Veselý (2018), p. 13.
31 While Central Italy may share features of both South and North, it is never the case that conclusions 
for Sicily could, for instance, apply to Lombardy or vice versa.
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the portion of the EU territory that includes some of the most renowned countries in 
the field of ALMPs.
With reference to the Youth Guarantee, the Province of Trento implemented the 
policy with the 807/2014 Decision of its Council. In particular, it started to pro-
vide NEETs aged between 15 and 29 years with different plans ranging from regular 
training programmes to experiences in the civil service. The same programmes have 
been offered and financed in the other Italian regions too (see Table 3 below). Pro-
grammes within the Youth Guarantee include internships, or on-the-job training at 
selected firms, apprenticeships, civil service, support for self-employment, profes-
sional formation, national and international mobility (see Table 3 below). Accord-
ing to national statistics, on-the-job training at selected firms is the measure that 
is most widespread (62.3%)32 and most successful in offering opportunities in the 
labour market. Indeed, it helps individuals both transition from school to work and 
acquire the necessary skills for the job market.33 Next are the services of accompani-
ment of the youth in the labour market and those regarding specialised formation. 
Some competence is also acquired through civil service, which includes activities in 
a series of sectors such as: services to individuals, environmental protection, cultural 
heritage, civil protection, and education for peace. Conversely, the SELFIEemploy-
ment support offered to those willing to start an enterprise is merely financial as is 
the occupational bonus granted to firms to support youth employment. Services of 
formation, instead, are generally offered to bring the individuals back to their studies 
or to provide them with vocational measures. Given the lack of empirical evalua-
tions of the Italian Youth Guarantee so far, no estimates are available in the mat-
ter of the aggregate effects of the different programmes offered apart from some 
descriptive statistics (see Table 4 below). It is, however, possible to make qualitative 
conjectures in terms of whether the measures are expected to have a short- or long-
term impact and whether the latter is likely to be positive or negative. Based on the 
nature of the measure itself and on how it is perceived by the Italian labour market, 
civil service, for instance is not likely to provide the youth with relevant training nor 
is it likely to increase her chances of becoming employed afterwards. On the other 
hand, specialised formation prepares candidates in a way that they are ready to start 
a profession and able to work in different specialised firms. The same is not neces-
sarily true for apprenticeships.34 The measure is not a popular contract in Italy and 
may even give a negative label to the candidate’s competence in case of disputes 
with the employer, who is responsible of filling out a final report on the apprentice.
As regards the services offered by the Province of Trento within the Youth Guar-
antee policy, the distinction is fourfold: programme A, which is the most popu-
lar form of training offered to young people and combines a period of orientation 
and formation with one of on-the-job training, or internship; programme B, which 
34 The fact that the former secretary of state for education Ugolini (2013) wrote an article on the national 
paper Corriere della Sera entitled “Why Do Apprenticeships Not Work in Italy?” is emblematic in this 
regard.
32 See Isfol’s report for 2016.
33 Ibid.
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provides training for specialised professional profiles; programme C, which consists 
of apprenticeships in various sectors, from general company services to agricul-
ture, and, therefore, is not assessed by the Agency of Labour as those who start an 
apprenticeship are automatically considered employed; and programme D, or civil 
service, which does not provide any particularly relevant form of training. In our 
analysis, we focus on the most popular and complete form of training programme; 
namely, programme A, defined within the EU Commission’s Decision C(2014) 4969 
of 11/07/2014.35 Young individuals register on the Italian website of the Youth 
Table 2  Relevant occupational 
statistics for Austria, Denmark, 
and the Province of Trento
The table shows the employment, unemployment, and activity rates 
for Austria, Denmark, and the Province of Trento in Italy. Data are 
collected from Eurostat and Istat for the years 2015, 2016, 2017, and 
2018. PT refers to the Province of Trento; AT refers to Austria; and 
DK refers to Denmark
Year Employment (%) Unemployment 
(%)
Activity (%)
PT AT DK PT AT DK PT AT DK
2018 68.2 73 74.1 4.8 4.8 4.9 71.7 76.8 79.4
2017 67.6 72.2 73.2 5.7 5.5 5.7 71.7 76.4 78.8
2016 66 71.5 72.7 6.8 6.0 6.2 70.9 76.2 79.9
2015 66.1 71.1 72 6.8 5.7 6.2 71 75.5 78.5
Table 3  Measures offered within the Youth Guarantee in Italy by region
The table shows the available measures in Italy for young people interested in the Youth Guarantee. The 
national institution for the formation of the workers, Isfol (2016), provides statistics on the use of each 
measure according to the four macro-regions of the country
Area North West North East Centre South and 
Islands
Total (%)
Internship (%) 50.2 62.7 64.9 76.2 62.3
Specialised formation (%) 6.5 16.7 2.4 5.3 6.8
Formation for education (%) 5.4 2.8 6.3 3.0 4.3
Apprenticeship (%) n.a. 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1
Accompaniment (%) 28.7 5.4 10.1 2.7 11.2
Civil service (%) 0.7 1.3 3.1 3.1 2.2
Self-employment (%) 0.0 1.0 0.4 0.3 0.4
Mobility (%) 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.2
Bonus (%) 11.6 9.8 12.4 9.0 10.5
Total 100 100 100 100 100
35 The current programmes available online on the Youth Guarantee website refer to the modified EU 
Commission’s Decision C(2017) 8927 of 18/12/2017.
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Guarantee and are assigned a first appointment at the job centre of reference within 
60  days from registration. The signing of a personalised service pact, or Patto di 
Servizio, with the job centre originates a formal agreement between the unemployed 
individual and the job centre. The personal project for the individual is chosen in 
respect to the availability to work of the individual; the measures of job search pro-
vided; and the consequences for the individual in the case of breach of agreement. 
Once collected the necessary information on the personal needs and skills of the 
individuals, the job centres are able to work as the German one-stop-shop agencies 
with a wide range of employment and training ‘products’. In particular, they pro-
vide individuals with tailored services that are similar to the individual action plans 
offered by the structures of the Danish Employment Regions. Plans, in particular, 
should always be motivated by the job centre. As regards NEETs, they are first pro-
vided with services of orientation and general formation, which last, respectively, 8 
Table 4  Job placement of 
participants in the Youth 
Guarantee by region, gender, 
profiling, and education
The table shows the job placement rates for certain segments of 
the population and geographical areas of Italy at the end of 2018. 
∗ Is the ratio between the number of individuals who were offered a 
job at least once and the number of individuals who completed the 
programme. ∗∗ Is the ratio between the number of individuals who 
work and the number of individuals who completed the programme. 
The profiling is computed based on the individuals level of educa-
tion, employment history, presence in Italy, entrepreneurial density 
in the area of origin. A youths profiling indicator is low if the indi-
vidual has a high probability to be reinstated in the labour market 
and its value falls between 0.000 and 0.250000; medium if it falls 
between 0.250001 and 0.50000; high if it falls between 0.50001 and 
0.750000; and finally, very high if the indicators value falls between 
0.750001 and 1, which indicates that the individual has a low prob-
ability to exit from her condition of occupational inactivity
Category Employed at least 
once∗
Employed∗∗
Females 76.6 51.6
Males 74.9 49.8
15–18 years old 71.3 45.7
19–24 years old 76.8 51.3
25–29 years old 75.6 51.3
Middle school diploma 71.7 41.5
High-school diploma 76.8 51.7
Tertiary education 76.9 57.2
Low profiling 84.2 62.4
Medium profiling 80.4 62.2
High profiling 78.7 54.2
Very high profiling 67.7 39.4
North West 79.7 59.5
North East 82.5 60.7
Centre 77.9 53.0
South and Islands 68.4 38.2
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and 26 h, and aim to introduce NEETs to the labour market. After the general forma-
tive period, which includes courses on safety at work, job search methods, IT and 
other transversal skills, NEETs are sent to selected firms to experience their on-the-
job training, which lasts between 8 and 24 weeks. In order for the individuals to be 
eligible to the programme evaluated in this study they have to be both a NEET, i.e. 
to be unemployed, not in education, and not in training, and aged between 16 and 29 
years (Table 5).36
Table 5  Total spending for the Youth Guarantee in Italy by region
The table shows the amount that has been spent for the Youth Guarantee in Italy and the GDP per capita 
distinguishing between regions. Data have been collected from the National Agency for Active Labour 
Market Policies, or ANPAL, and refer to the report of 31 December 2018, as well as from the National 
Institute for Statistics, or Istat, also for 2018. ∗∗Indicates the ratio between the amount spent and the 
amount programmed for the spending. ∗∗ At current prices. Youth unemployment rates are collected from 
Istat and refer to individuals aged 15–24 in 2018
Region Amount spent (€) Realised effi-
ciency∗ (%)
GDP per capita∗∗ Youth unem-
ployment 
(%)
Piedmont 89,787.74 95.6 137,488.2 30.0
Valle d’Aosta 1428.09 100 4902.0 21.7
Liguria 18,747.86 100 50,109.1 36.3
Lombardy 91,542.82 99.4 380,331.2 20.8
PA Trento 4705.32 69.9 20,606.5 15.3
Venetia 58,428.75 100 163,171.3 21.0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 13,533.74 91.3 38,139.6 23.7
Emilia-Romagna 67,748.52 100 161,705.8 17.8
Tuscany 44,626.02 92.3 117,748.3 22.9
Umbria 17,250.92 99.5 22,338.4 31.1
The Marches 21,592.62 91.7 42,914.4 22.1
Latium 93,011.28 90.8 197,742.7 34.5
The Abruzzi 19,333.51 100 33,596.2 29.7
Molise 3580.74 66.7 6342.2 40.3
Sardinia 30,042.57 89.7 34,541.7 35.7
Campania 123,956.79 89.8 106,071.6 53.6
Apulia 87,761.29 99.2 75,333.9 43.6
Basilicata 12,293.66 100 12,358.3 38.7
Calabria 22,751.11 100 33,142.8 52.7
Sicily 107,818.45 99 88,626.8 53.6
36 The reason why Italy decided to increase the age limits from 24 years, as recommended by the EU 
Commission, to 29 years probably originates from the existence of the 181/2000 Law Decree that guar-
anteed an offer of training, or professional retraining, to people up to the age of 29 years within 4 months 
from registration as unemployed. Moreover, the amount of European and national funds that Italy 
received for the programme were sufficient to cover not only the number of potential NEETs predisposed 
by the European Union 120/01 Recommendation (those under 24 years old, equal to 1,274,000 in Italy), 
but the annual flow of actual NEETs (those under 29 years old, namely 2,254,000 individuals). Addi-
tional information can be found on www.garan ziagi ovani .gov.it.
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4  Empirical strategy
With the Youth Guarantee regulation in existence, deciding to participate or not to 
participate may make a difference in the individual’s probability to find employment 
due to the potential benefits of the programme. The focus of the analysis will not 
regard inactivity per se but, more specifically, occupational outcomes; namely, the 
likelihood of individuals to find a job and their chances of being offered a stable 
contract. In particular, entrance into the labour market is considered successful if 
the individual is offered her first job since participation in the Youth Guarantee pro-
gramme. To investigate the potential advantages of participation, we use a differ-
ence-in-differences model that exploits fixed effects. The model, in particular, com-
pares the average occupational outcomes Yict of treated and untreated groups c of 
individuals i before and after treatment, i.e. over time t.
Our outcomes of interest Yct are the individual i’s of cohort c probability to find a job 
and probability to be offered an open-ended contract, independent of her employ-
ment status,37 in time t. In particular, we aim to investigate both the tendency to exit 
inactivity, understood as inactivity in the labour market, and the quality of employ-
ment offered, understood as job stability. Rationally, Yct is either Y0ct or Y1ct , depend-
ing on the participation status of the group members. PARTICict is the participation 
status of a member i of a specified age group c in a period t. The dummy is equal 
to 1 when the individual succeeds in completing her on-the-job training experience, 
or internship. YEARpt are the 2 year dummies 2016 and 2017, with 2015 as the year 
of reference, or the time trends that are common to both treated and untreated indi-
viduals; while, COHgc are the three age cohorts, with the individuals who are never 
eligible considered as the category of reference. We define, in particular, four groups 
depending on their age of reference, i.e. their age at the first available check date 
after having applied for the programme. This allows us to have at our disposal a 
group of people who are always eligible38 in the time periods considered; a group 
(1)Yict = 훼ic + 휆DDPARTICict +
3∑
g=1
훽gCOHgc +
2017∑
p=2016
훾pYEARpt + 휂ict
37 For mathematical reasons, the probability of being offered an open-ended contract in a given period 
Pr(Y
OPEN_t = 1) is equal to the sum of the probability of being offered an open-ended contract condi-
tional on the probability of becoming employed in a given period multiplied by the probability of 
becoming employed in a given period Pr(Y
OPEN_t = 1|YEMPLOYED_t = 1)Pr(YEMPLOYED_t = 1) and of 
the probability of being offered an open-ended contract conditional on the probability of not becoming 
employed in a given period multiplied by the probability of not becoming employed in a given period 
Pr(Y
OPEN_t = 1|YEMPLOYED_t = 0)Pr(YEMPLOYED_t = 0) . As this last expression is null, then the the prob-
ability of being offered an open-ended contract in a given period Pr(Y
OPEN_t = 1) is equal to the sum 
of the probability of being offered an open-ended contract conditional on the probability of becom-
ing employed in a given period multiplied by the probability of becoming employed in a given period 
Pr(Y
OPEN_t = 1|YEMPLOYED_t = 1)Pr(YEMPLOYED_t = 1).
38 Assumed all training programmes have an average duration of minimum a year and based on the indi-
vidual’s birth date, eligibility is, for instance, flagged as equal to 1 in 2015 when at the check date of the 
year before the individual was observed as being under the age of 30 years old.
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of people who are always eligible in the time periods considered except for the last 
period; a group of people who are always non eligible in the time periods consid-
ered except for the first period; and, finally, a group of people who are always non 
eligible in the time periods considered. As regards the error term, the nature of the 
model, which takes into account different periods of time, encourages us to use clus-
tered standard errors so as to avoid serial correlation. The causal effect of interest is 
given by 휆DD , which measures a double difference; namely, the difference between 
the average occupational outcomes before and after treatment for the participants of 
the programme (treat) minus the difference between the average occupational out-
comes before and after treatment for the non participants of the programme (non-
treat). 휆DD , in particular, represents the effect observed for the treated individuals in 
the post-treatment periods.
Given the nature of the outcomes studied, it follows that participation per se in the 
programme may be correlated with unobservables that are correlated with the error 
term. In particular, the cohort dimension allows to control for unobserved but fixed 
omitted variables. Individuals from a certain group, for instance, could be more 
experienced regardless of their participation in the programme. Similarly, candi-
dates of another group could be offered better positions and earn higher salaries 
independent of their participation in the programme. In respect to this, the estima-
tion assumes that the potentially unobserved group characteristics Iic do not vary 
in time and that participation is as good as randomly assigned conditional on some 
individual- and group-specific qualities 훼ic . Most importantly, for the design to hold, 
individuals from both treatment and control groups should experience parallel trends 
as regards the occupational outcomes. This means that:
Nevertheless, while the difference between treated and non-treated individuals, 
conditional on being observed in the same year and belonging to the same cohort, 
removes common trends, the linear model proposed does not discharge estimates 
from a potential selection bias. The latter is explained by the sampling bias due to 
self-selection in the programme on behalf of participants. As explained in Sect. 3, 
eligible individuals who are occupationally inactive have the same right to par-
ticipate in any programme of the Youth Guarantee. However, they are required to 
voluntarily apply for participating in the Youth Guarantee, which requires applying 
online; setting up a meeting with the job centre of reference; and signing a contract 
of commitment to the programme with them. Since the effect we estimate recurring 
to (1) will give us a biased average treatment effect (ATT) due to sampling bias, we 
also study the intention-to-treat effect (ITT), which preserves the balance obtained 
from original randomisation independent of the treatment received. Because indi-
viduals need to apply in order to participate in the on-the-job training programme 
and any other job-placement service implemented within the Youth Guarantee con-
text and offered by the Agency of Trento, one limitation of our analysis is that the 
(2)?̂?DD = Y
treat
1
− Y
treat
0
− (Y
nontreat
1
− Y
nontreat
0
)
(3)E[Yic,1 − Yic,0|treatic = 1] = E[Yic,1 − Yic,0|nontreatic = 1]
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estimation of any potential treatment effect includes self-selection. Individuals who 
are interested in taking part in programme A select themselves in the group of the 
treated. For this reason, we also account for individuals who are registered at the 
Agency of Labour as unemployed, who only differ by their age, or eligibility, and 
who therefore do not give origin to a biased sample. In particular, we are interested 
in understanding whether there exists a benefit for eligible individuals compared to 
non-eligible individuals in terms of both finding a job and being offered an open-
ended contract, such as in (4). In Sect.  6.2 we also provide an intention-to-treat 
analysis only for those individuals who are observed close to the eligibility cutoff. 
Reasonably, the actual effect of the on-the-job training experience promoted by the 
Agency of Labour of Trento in the context of the Youth Guarantee will be between 
the estimated treatment and intention-to-treat effects.
where ELIGict is the eligibility status of a member i of a specified age group c in a 
period t and according to which, the effect for eligible individuals on their probabil-
ity to become employed and their probability to be offered a permanent position in 
the post-treatment periods is given by:
The decision to opt for a standard linear probability model to estimate the impact of 
the Youth Guarantee in the Province of Trento lies in the impracticality of non-lin-
ear models such as logistics, probabilistic, or tobit models. Based on Puhani (2012), 
the estimation from a non-linear model of the impact of a training programme such 
as the one investigated in this study may not be ideal as two, rather than one, cross 
differences would be necessary due to the existence of both the expectations of the 
observed outcomes and the potential outcomes. Estimations from a linear probabil-
ity model, on the other hand, may suffer from the intrinsic problem of unbounded 
predicted probabilities with respect to the dichotomous outcomes of interest, namely 
Yict . This means that the fundamental law of probability may be not satisfied and that 
there could exist individuals for which the probability to become employed or to 
be offered an open-ended contract may be nonsensically smaller than 0 and bigger 
than 1. As argued by Angrist and Pischke (2008), the fact that regression may gener-
ate fitted values outside the limited dependent variables (LDV) boundaries ‘both-
ers some researchers’; ‘point conceded’. However, we agree with the authors that 
linear models are not necessarily ‘inappropriate’ for LDV analyses. This is because, 
due the fact that Di , or the treatment dummy variable, is independent of potential 
outcomes, E[Yi|Di = 1] − E[Yi|Di = 0] = E[Y1i|Di = 1] − E[Y0i|Di = 1] , which is 
equal to E[Y1i − Y0i] . In other words, while non-linear regression functions, such 
as Tobit’s, have been defined by Deaton (1997) as ‘an awkward, difficult, and non-
robust object’, the technique of ordinary least squared is standardised. According to 
the authors, ‘the fact that Yi is a dummy means only that the average treatment effects 
are also differences in probabilities’. Even if in our analysis we are not interested in 
(4)Yict = 훼ic + 휔DDELIGict +
3∑
g=1
훽gCOHgc +
2017∑
p=2016
훾pYEARpt + 휂ict,
(5)?̂?DD = Y
elig
1
− Y
elig
0
− (Y
nonelig
1
− Y
nonelig
0
)
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such potential extreme outcomes but in rather the sensible average occupational out-
comes, we find it considerate to compare the impact of the policy estimated from 
both a linear model and a non-linear model. However, non-linear models cannot be 
interpreted unless the output is transformed into what Angrist and Pischke (2008) 
call the average changes in the conditional expectation function E(Yi|Di ), or the 
marginal effects constructed by E{E[Yi|Xi,Di = 1] − E[Yi|Xi,Di = 0} . For this rea-
son, in Sect. 6.2 we present the marginal effects from a logistic model that models 
the probability p for our binary dependent variable Yict to be equal to 0 or 1; namely, 
employed or not, or offered an open-ended contact or not, such as in:
where F(z) = exp(z)
1+exp(z)
 is the logistic cumulative distribution function.
Finally, pre- and post-treatment observations are available at the individual level. 
However, the same individuals are not observed before the implementation of the 
Youth Guarantee in the European Union. For this reason, it is not possible to test 
the assumption of parallel trends according to the standard rule. First, we provide 
evidence on the similarity of the individuals in both treated and non-treated groups. 
Details are provided in the next section. Second, we present graphical evidence of the 
trend of eligible and non-eligible individuals, as well as participating and non-partic-
ipating individuals, with respect to their probability to become employed and proba-
bility to be offered an open-ended contract over the 3 years of our observation period. 
Third, we exploit the measure of profiling with which participants are assessed so 
as to demonstrate that it is not this individual characteristic that drives the results in 
terms of treatment effectiveness, as well as we provide intention-to-treat estimates for 
individuals who are very close to the eligibility cutoff. This is presented in Sect. 6.2.
5  Data and descriptive analysis
We have access to longitudinal individual data on individuals who officially regis-
ter as unemployed and that are directly collected by the Agency of Labour of the 
Province Trento. The panel covers three periods. Individuals are observed between 
2014 and 2017. The sample analysed includes 48,888 observations for 16,296 indi-
viduals of age between 16 and 35 years and from 104 different countries. The data 
collected by the Agency of Labour cover all applicants and include information on 
their age, gender, country of origin, employment condition after the policy, and type 
of contract offered, if any. The same data source includes information that covers 
only the participants of the Youth Guarantee programme. The information available 
for participants also includes the number of days they stayed at the firm for their on-
the-job training and the profiling indicator, defined as a measure of unemployment 
risk.39 This information will be used in the “Appendix”, which focuses exclusively 
(6)
Pr(Yict = 1
||Xict = F
(
훼ic + 휆DDPARTICict +
3∑
g=1
훽gCOHgc +
2017∑
p=2016
훾pYEARpt
)
,
39 The lower the profiling indicator, the lower the difficulty to reinstate the subject into the labour market 
and vice versa.
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on participants. On this subject, it is, however, crucial to stress that our data set is 
made of individuals whose profiling is heterogeneous, as a high percentage of indi-
viduals with high or low profiling could bias the estimates on the real effect of the 
policy. As regards the gender and nationality of the individuals, Table 2 shows that 
these are well distributed across the sample. In 2015, 48.5% of the individuals are 
women in the treated group. The proportions remain constant over time. This is also 
true in respect to the nationalities that are registered at the Agency of Labour. In 
particular, we observe a larger proportion of Southern Europeans who participate, 
with 92.9% of them who are treated in 2015. On the other hand, there is an insig-
nificant proportion of Northern Europeans who are treated over time. Similarly, 
individuals from Eastern Europe are only 8.6% of the total of the participants in 
2017. We also find a relevant number of subjects originally from Africa (6.5%), the 
Arab countries (2.1%), and Latin America (1.6%). As expected, participants, who 
are averagely 24 years old in 2017, tend to be younger than non participants, who 
are averagely 32.1 years old in 2017 (see Table 6). Any potential significant differ-
ence between treated and non-treated individuals in terms of individual character-
istics cancels out in the difference-in-differences strategy. Unfortunately, we do not 
have access to the employment histories of the individuals. However, we rely on the 
information provided by the Agency of Labour in respect to their official registra-
tion as unemployed. On the other hand, the fact that they are all registered at the 
Agency of Labour as unemployed implies that they can all tend to both employment 
or unemployment in the future.
The model used allows us to ignore the gender and nationality of the individu-
als as they are considered individual-specific qualities that do not change over time. 
In particular, we distinguish four groups of individuals who differ in their age and, 
thus, in their entitlement to participate in the programme. As the dates of start and 
end of the programme are not observed for all the individuals in the data set, we use 
dates that are common to everyone every year. These are the so-called check dates 
on 10 November 2015, 10 November 2016, and 10 November 2017; from now on 
2015, 2016, and 2017. Entitlement to the programme and participation status are 
defined based on these dates. In particular, individuals are defined within the four 
groups based on the age they had at the first check date available following the start 
date of the programme. The participation dummy, on the other hand, is flagged as 
active when the individual has completed the training. This assures that the dates 
at which labour outcomes are registered are subsequent to the corresponding treat-
ment. In respect to their entitlement to the programme, individuals are divided 
according to four groups. As for the first group, these are the individuals who are 
always eligible in the years taken into account for the analysis. This can be observed 
in Table 8, which also shows the treatment, employment, and job stability status of 
the members of each group.
As regards participation, 3% of the members who belong to our group 1 appear 
to have completed their training by 2015. The proportion increases up to 19.7% and 
15.8% for, respectively, 2016 and 2017. With reference to group 2 these are the indi-
viduals who are always eligible except for the last year considered in the analysis. In 
particular, 1.9% of them completed their training by 2015, while the majority com-
pleted their training by the second year of the Youth Guarantee (7.4%). In the last 
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Table 6  Distribution of predetermined covariates by year
The data are provided by the Agency of Trento and refer to the unemployed individuals registered as 
such in the Province of Trento between 2014 and 2017. In this table, the analysis is done for the prede-
termined covariates of the individuals; namely, their gender and nationality. The individuals of the sam-
ple come from 104 different countries, which are here agglomerated according to a classification of the 
macro-areas of the world. Standard errors are expressed in parentheses. Two-sample t-test statistics (dif-
ference) are also showed in the table.
Covariates Non treated Treated NT Treat. NT Treat.
[Mean] [Mean] [Mean] [Mean] [Mean] [Mean]
Year 2015 2016 2017
Age 29.6 25.7 31.1 24.7 32.1 24.0
(years) (0.037) (0.213) (0.035) (0.093) (0.034) (0.107)
t = 13.526 p-value = .000 t = 59.913 p-value = .000 t = 64.043 p-value = .000
Gender 0.562 0.485 0.572 0.452 0.571 0.428
(Female = 1
)
(0.004) (0.031) (0.004) (0.013) (0.004) (0.015)
t = 2.519 p-value = .011 t = 9.167 p-value = .000 t = 9.451 p-value = .000
Northern 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000
Europe (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
t = 0.697 p-value = .486 t = 1.758 p-value = .079 t = 1.489 p-value = .136
Southern 0.625 0.929 0.608 0.835 0.616 0.808
Europe (0.004) (0.016) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.012)
t = −10.258 p-value = .000 t = −17.879 p-value = .000 t = −13.067 p-value = .000
Eastern 0.251 0.045 0.266 0.079 0.260 0.086
Europe (0.003) (0.013) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008)
t = 7.783 p-value = .000 t = 16.418 p-value = .000 t = 13.335 p-value = .000
Developed 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.001
Asia (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
t = 0.878 p-value = .380 t = 2.216 p-value = .027 t = 1.302 p-value = .193
Undevel-
oped
0.010 0.000 0.011 0.002 0.010 0.005
Asia (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
t = 1.649 p-value = .099 t = 3.354 p-value = .001 t = 1.673 p-value = .094
U.S. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
t = 0.183 p-value = .855 t = 0.461 p-value = .645 t = 0.391 p-value = .696
Latin 0.019 0.015 0.020 0.012 0.020 0.016
America (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004)
t = 0.522 p-value = .602 t = 2.164 p-value = .031 t = 0.945 p-value = .343
Arab 0.019 0.004 0.019 0.017 0.019 0.021
Countries (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004)
t = 1.861 p-value = .063 t = 0.600 p-value = .549 t = −0.399 p-value = .690
Africa 0.071 0.007 0.071 0.055 0.070 0.065
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007)
t = 4.037 p-value = .000 t = 2.425 p-value = .015 t = 0.669 p-value = .503
Observa-
tions
16,028 268 14,729 1567 15,140 1156
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available period of training of 2017, 2.4% of the members of this group completed 
their training. As regards the individuals who are never eligible apart from the first 
year of the Youth Guarantee, we observe that by 2015, only 1.8% of the members of 
group 3 completed the programme. The reason we observe an insignificant minor-
ity of individuals from group 4 as participants lies in the design of the data set, 
which exploits the yearly check dates and not the end dates of the training. In 2017 
no member of this group is observed as having experienced treatment. Statistics, in 
general, show that the greatest variation with respect to participation is observed for 
the same individuals over time, and not across groups, or across time periods (see 
Table 7 below).
In respect to the outcomes of interest, the data at our disposal do not allow for 
inferring educational effects about NEETs. We, instead, investigate whether indi-
viduals who participate are more likely to find a job than those who did not take part 
in the programme. We also investigate whether the contract offered to the individual 
is stable; namely, if it is more probable for participants to be offered an open-ended 
contract, independent of becoming employed. In particular, we are interested in 
observing the first successful occupational outcome for each individual; namely, the 
first offer of job accepted by them, if any, and the type of contract issued. The major-
ity of those who become employed in the period under investigation, for instance, 
sign a standard short-term contract (about 44.6%), a standard long-term contract 
(27.4%), or start a professional apprenticeship (8.7%). Options, however, include 
a range of other alternative contracts, including contracts of domestic work,40 
Table 7  How participation varies: overall, between, within
The data are provided by the Agency of Trento and refer to the unemployed individuals registered as 
such in the Province of Trento between 2014 and 2017. The table shows the variation of the variable 
participation overall, between individuals, and within time. The table presents estimates overall and for 
the single groups. Group 1 represents individuals who are always eligible in the time periods considered; 
group 2 represents individuals who are always eligible in the time periods considered except for the last 
year; group 3 represents individuals who are never eligible in the time periods considered except for the 
first year; group 4 represents individuals who are never eligible in the time periods considered
Participation Mean SD VAR SD VAR SD VAR
Overall Overall Between Between Within Within
Panel A: All 0.061 0.240 0.058 0.129 0.017 0.202 0.041
Observations N = 48,888 n = 16,296 T = 3
Panel B: Group 1 0.128 0.334 0.112 0.162 0.026 0.292 0.085
Observations N = 21,370 n = 7,126 T = 3
Panel C: Group 2 0.039 0.193 0.037 0.107 0.011 0.161 0.026
Observations N = 3545 n = 1183 T = 3
Panel D: Group 3 0.023 0.149 0.022 0.084 0.007 0.123 0.015
Observations N = 3256 n = 1090 T = 3
Panel E: Group 4 0.001 0.031 0.001 0.018 0.000 0.025 0.001
Observations N = 19,812 n = 6605 T = 3
40 Which is expected to be direct and exclusive.
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permanent collaborations,41 work-for-hire projects,42 occasional work, internships, 
socially useful work or activities financed by the Solidarity Funds,43 on-call con-
tracts, agency contracts, work bursary and other work experiences,44 temporary 
Table 8  Descriptive statistics for individuals registered at the Agency of Labour of Trento in 2014–2017
The data are provided by the Agency of Trento and refer to the unemployed individuals registered as 
such in the Province of Trento between 2014 and 2017. For all unemployed individuals in the sample, 
we observe their gender and nationality, which are the subject-specific qualities of the individuals. In 
this table, we provide some statistics on the eligibility, participation status, and occupational outcomes 
of four defined cohorts of individuals. Group 1 represents individuals who are always eligible in the time 
periods considered; group 2 represents individuals who are always eligible in the time periods considered 
except for the last year; group 3 represents individuals who are never eligible in the time periods consid-
ered except for the first year; group 4 represents individuals who are never eligible in the time periods 
considered. Standard errors are expressed in parentheses
Variables observed 2015 2016 2017 2015 2016 2017
Group 1 Mean Group 3 Mean
Entitlement 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Participation 0.030 0.197 0.158 0.018 0.051 0.000
(0.169) (0.398) (0.365) (0.131) (0.219) (0.000)
Employed 0.226 0.318 0.410 0.222 0.279 0.335
(0.418) (0.466) (0.492) (0.416) (0.449) (0.472)
Open-Ended 0.080 0.139 0.193 0.087 0.116 0.129
(0.271) (0.346) (0.395) (0.281) (0.321) (0.335)
Observations 7126 7122 7122 1086 1085 1085
Group 2 Mean Group 4 Mean
Entitlement 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Participation 0.019 0.074 0.024 0.002 0.001 0.000
(0.135) (0.261) (0.152) (0.041) (0.033) (0.012)
Employed 0.229 0.292 0.324 0.198 0.255 0.301
(0.421) (0.455) (0.468) (0.398) (0.436) (0.459)
Open-Ended 0.090 0.124 0.144 0.072 0.111 0.129
(0.286) (0.330) 0.351) (0.259) (0.315) (0.335)
Observations 1181 1182 1182 6602 6605 6605
41 Co.co.co.s expect the worker to work independently in the company and without obligations of sub-
ordination, but through a permanent and coordinated relationship with the customer, i.e. the employer of 
the company.
42 Co.co.pro.s were abrogated with the 81/2015 Law Decree but are still active for those contracts regis-
tered as such. They, too, expect a service from the worker but the latter is independent and can either be 
involved for a whole project, a programme, or just part of it.
43 If unemployed individuals have difficulty reaching for social networks in general, this is even harder 
for those NEETs who are totally inactive and, thus, probably socially isolated.
44 Educational tool that uses work experience to facilitate the entry of socially weak categories, as are 
some not-in-employment, not-in-education, not-in-training individuals, into the labour market.
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agency contracts,45 or supply contracts,46 self-employment, and independent work in 
the show business.
As regards the tendency of individuals to become employed, the proportions 
change among groups but always increase over time. In particular, individuals from 
group 1 are employed 22.6%, 31.8%, and 41% of the time by, respectively, 2015, 
2016, and 2017. On the other hand, they are offered an open-ended contract 8%, 
13.9%, and 19.3% of the time by, respectively, 2015, 2016, and 2017. A similar 
increasing pattern is found for the members of the other groups. Individuals from 
group 2 are employed 22.9%, 29.2%, and 32.4% of the time by, respectively, 2015, 
2016, and 2017. They, too, are offered a stable contract 9%, 12.4%, and 14.4% of the 
time by, 2015, 2016, and 2017. As regards group 3, its member find an occupation 
22.2%, 27.9%, and 33.5% of the time by, respectively, 2015, 2016, and 2017. They 
start a permanent job 8.7%, 11.6%, and 12.9% of the time by, respectively, 2015, 
2016, and 2017. Finally, individuals who are never eligible to the programme are 
offered a job 19.8%, 25.5%, and 30.1% of the time by, respectively, 2015, 2016, and 
2017. On the other hand, they sign an open-ended contract 7.2%, 11.1%, and 12.9% 
of the time throughout the years of 2015, 2016, and 2017 (Table 8).
With respect to the assumption of existing parallel trends, and as mentioned in 
the previous section, the data used for this analysis do not allow for a standard test 
of the former. Pre- and post-treatment observations are, indeed, available only at the 
individual level. This means that the same individuals are not observed for a signifi-
cantly long period of time before the official implementation of the Youth Guarantee 
in the European Union, which varies across countries, regions, job centres, and indi-
viduals. In addition to showing that the sample under observation is rather homoge-
neous in the proportion of males and females, as well as in the proportion of individ-
uals from the different areas of Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America, the U.S., and 
the Arab countries, we provide a graphical analysis of the trend towards employ-
ment and permanent occupation, or open-ended contracts, of both eligible and non-
eligible individuals over 2015, 2016, and 2017. Figure 1a, in particular, shows that 
unemployed individuals registered at the Agency of Labour of Trento are not only 
similarly spread according to gender and nationality in our sample, but that their 
trend towards the likelihood of becoming employed follows the same upward direc-
tion over the years. The likelihood of becoming employed increases over the years 
for both eligible and non-eligible individuals. A similar pattern is found for eligible 
and non-eligible individuals as regards their trend towards permanent occupation. 
As can be observed in Fig. 1b, both types of individuals present an increasing ten-
dency to be offered an open-ended contract from 2015 to 2017. Parallel trends in the 
probability to become employed and in the probability to be offered a permanent job 
are confirmed when we compare treated and non-treated individuals (see Fig. 2a, b). 
45 The agent promotes the conclusion of the contract between the interested third party and the worker, 
but leaves them with the responsibility of concluding and perfecting it, without taking any risk.
46 Created with the 30/2003 Biagi Law to substitute the 196/1997 Law on the temporary, or ad interim, 
agency contract.
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A visual inspection shows that the difference between the treated group and the con-
trol group stays constant over time.
6  Results
6.1  Treatment and eligibility effects
In relation to participation in the Youth Guarantee, findings from a linear probabil-
ity model analysed on stata suggest the latter is actually beneficial for individuals. 
Table  9 shows that participation in the on-the-job training experience leads to an 
increase in job opportunities for the individuals. Accounting for different groups of 
eligibility and for year effects, the first column shows that participants are 7.4 per-
centage points more likely to be offered a job compared to non participants. Simi-
larly, the second column of Table 9 shows that participation in this EU active labour 
market policy leads to a higher probability to start a permanent employment rela-
tionship. Participants are indeed 4.4 percentage points more likely to be offered an 
open-ended contract, independent of becoming employed. Both estimates are sig-
nificant at 1% level and robust to variations in the identification of the model (see 
Sect. 6.2). In particular, results from a logistic, or non-linear, model illustrate that 
the marginal effects are significantly positive for participants. The fact that linear 
and non-linear marginal effects present a larger gap and may fail to be ‘indistin-
guishable’, due to predictions being close to 0 (or 1) seems, according to Angrist 
and Pischke (2008), ‘unlikely to be of substantive importance’. When we model the 
likelihood of an individual to become employed and to be offered an open-ended 
contract, we find a discrete change or relative advantage for treated units of, respec-
tively, 5.5 and percentage points, significant at 1% level (see Table  10). Because 
of the potential issue of self-selection due to participants of the Youth Guarantee 
applying for taking part in the on-the-job training experience, we also provide esti-
mates for the comparative advantage of eligible individuals over non-eligible indi-
viduals. In the ‘once randomised, always analysed’ context, Table 11 shows that the 
group of eligible individuals is more likely to become employed and be offered an 
open-ended contract by, respectively, 3.8 and 2.7 percentage points, significant at 
1% level. Results from a robustness check described in Sect.  6.2 show that when 
restricting the sample under investigation to individuals who are close to the eligi-
bility cutoff, intention-to-treat estimates are comparable to those estimated for treat-
ment (see Table 12). Findings, in particular, are in line with the study by Cappellini 
et al. (2018) on the implementation of the Youth Guarantee in Tuscany. Results by 
Cammeraat et al. (2017) on Dutch NEETs could also take a positive turn once stud-
ied the impact of a European rather than national policy.
With respect to the impact of the policy in the Province of Trento and in Tuscany, 
its magnitude differs in the two Italian areas. The smaller impact found in the Prov-
ince of Trento may be due to several reasons. The type of participants themselves 
matter and might contribute to influencing estimates. Statistics produced for the year 
2016 by the Tuscan institute of research IRPET indicate that 60% of the participat-
ing individuals were assigned a low profiling indicator; namely, a low difficulty to 
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be reinstated in the labour market. Conversely, less than 5% of the participants were 
assigned a high profiling indicator. The same report also defines the average partici-
pant in Tuscany as a 20–24 year old Italian recent graduate.47 Additionally, on this 
occasion, we evaluated one single programme; namely, that of on-the-job training. 
Cappellini et al. (2018), on the other hand, do not specify the focus of their analysis 
in terms of programme evaluated.48 Indeed, they take into account any individual 
who registers for the Youth Guarantee independent of the programme, from intern-
ship or vocational training to civil or community service. The three aforementioned 
reasons contribute to justifying the slightly smaller magnitude of our estimates 
compared to this region of Central Italy. On the other hand, they are comparable as 
their analysis is likely to focus on an active labour market policy of the same type. 
Indeed, we know from official Italian statistics that internships are the most popular 
programme in both Italy (62.3%) and Tuscany.49 We also know that Tuscany offers 
internships that are similar to the ones in the Province of Trento in that they fol-
low the guidelines put in place by the European Union. Therefore, we can suppose 
Fig. 1  Trend towards employment and permanent occupation by eligibility, 2015–2017
Fig. 2  Trend towards employment and permanent occupation by participation, 2015–2017
47 For more information see “Piano di Attuazione Regionale Toscana N. 992”, pp. 12–13.
48 The Youth Guarantee offers a wide range of active measures.
49 Isfol, Rapporto Sulla “Garanzia Giovani in Italia” (2016) for Italy and “Piano di Attuazione Regionale 
Toscana N. 992”, pp. 12–13 for Tuscany.
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that, even if not specified, what they evaluate for the most part in their analysis are 
on-the-job training experiences. Except for the slightly different magnitude of the 
estimates, our study contributes to confirming the positive impact of training on the 
young Italian population. Results are also in line with Heckman’s (2000) argument 
of ALMPs being fruitful for young categories of individuals, such as adolescent 
high school dropouts and young parents.
As regards the significantly positive effect for participants, it seems that the 
theory of internships as immediate door openers holds for the Province of Trento. 
While job creation schemes and other measures appear not to be particularly fruit-
ful, on-the-job training has been shown to be a successful ALMP in several studies 
Table 9  Difference-in-
differences estimate of the effect 
of participation in the Youth 
Guarantee on Pr(employed) and 
Pr(open-ended contract)
The data are provided by the Agency of Trento and refer to the 
unemployed individuals registered as such in the Province of Trento 
between 2014 and 2017. The analysis reported in the table looks 
at the probability of the individuals to become employed and to be 
offered an open-ended contract based on their participation, depend-
ing on their group of membership. Group 1 represents individu-
als who are always eligible in the time periods considered; group 2 
represents individuals who are always eligible in the time periods 
considered except for the last year; group 3 represents individuals 
who are never eligible in the time periods considered except for the 
first year; group 4 represents individuals who are never eligible in 
the time periods considered. The year of reference is 2015 and the 
group of comparison is group 4. Errors are clustered at individual 
level and expressed in parentheses. Significance at 1, 5, 10% levels 
correspond, respectively, to ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗
Dependent variable Pr(employed) Pr(open-
ended 
contract)
PARTIC 0.074∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.006)
GROUP1 0.110∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.005)
GROUP2 −0.033 −0.020
(0.055) (0.033)
GROUP3 0.122∗∗ 0.007
(0.056) (0.020)
YEAR2 0.067∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002)
YEAR3 0.134∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003)
CONS 0.159∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.004)
Observations 48,888 48,888
Individuals 16,296 16,296
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for specific categories of individuals.50 In respect to young individuals, training is 
a remedy that is likely to increase their job opportunities as it is precisely designed 
with the scope of upgrading their skills. Supposedly, participants are also suffi-
ciently prepared to signal that their skills are good or that they have really improved 
during the internship. This allows them to have greater chances to become employed 
compared to the non participants, who did not have any contact with the employer 
in the same circumstances. According to Heckman (2000), the advantage of provid-
ing training in firms lies in the possibility for the employers to invest in those indi-
viduals with some potential from a perspective of skills. The success of the Center 
for Employment and Training in California, for instance, is to be attributed to the 
fact that many courses were taught by experts from the industry themselves and that 
a large number of employers were present in the advisory board. The programme 
in selected firms promoted by the Youth Guarantee seems to follow a similar pat-
tern. Additionally, the combination of specialised training with services of general 
formation proves effective in making NEETs more flexible to the requests of the 
firms present in their territory. This is in line with the findings of Piva et al. (2005), 
which underline the importance of promoting general knowledge so as to prepare 
individuals to the organisational changes in the structure of Italian manufacturing 
firms. On this subject, the presence of a large number of firms involved in the Youth 
Guarantee allows for competition in terms of both type of training offered, future job 
opportunity, and professional mobility. This, according to Heckman (2000) would 
only bring further success.
Table 10  Marginal effects on 
Pr(employed) and Pr(open-
ended contract) from a linear 
and non-linear model
The data are provided by the Agency of Trento and refer to the 
unemployed individuals registered as such in the Province of Trento 
between 2014 and 2017. The table shows the marginal effects from 
both linear and non-linear (logistic) models. Estimating margins 
using a logistic model implies losing some observations due to the 
fact that the coefficient of the individual’s fixed effect perfectly pre-
dicts her occupational outcome, contrarily to what happens in a lin-
ear estimation, where the fixed effect’s coefficient is equal to zero. 
While the linear model keeps all the 48,888 original observations 
for both Pr(employed) and Pr(open-ended contract), in the logistic 
model the observations become 15,222 for Pr(employed) and 7257 
for Pr(open-ended contract). Significance at 1, 5, 10% levels corre-
spond, respectively, to ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗
Marginal effects Pr(employed) Pr(open-
ended 
contract)
From a linear model 0.074∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.016)
From a non-linear model 0.055∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.012)
50 See Katz (1994); Bonnal et al. (1997); Meager (2008); Stephan (2008); Saniter and Siedler (2014); 
Card et al. (2011, 2010); Escudero (2018); and others.
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On the other hand, the recommendation of the European Union itself could also 
have contributed to increasing the expectations of both the participants, the employ-
ers, and the job centres. The European Union states, indeed, that despite there being 
‘a need for a short-term response, the establishment of such schemes is of long-
term significance’.51 Member states, for once, could haven taken this youth policy 
seriously. As regards job stability, more specifically, findings seem to highlight the 
ability of the Youth Guarantee to overcome flexinsecurity in countries like Italy. As 
stressed in Sect. 3, the discrimination of the use of flexibility can negatively impact 
the more disadvantaged subjects. In the Italian case, for instance, its misuse often 
Table 11  Difference-in-
differences estimate of the 
effect of eligibility in the Youth 
Guarantee on Pr(employed) and 
Pr(open-ended contract)
The data are provided by the Agency of Trento and refer to the 
unemployed individuals registered as such in the Province of Trento 
between 2014 and 2017. The analysis reported in the table looks 
at the probability of the individuals to become employed and to 
be offered an open-ended contract based on their eligibility status. 
Group 1 represents individuals who are always eligible in the time 
periods considered; group 2 represents individuals who are always 
eligible in the time periods considered except for the last year; group 
3 represents individuals who are never eligible in the time periods 
considered except for the first year; group 4 represents individuals 
who are never eligible in the time periods considered. The year of 
reference is 2015 and the group of comparison is group 4. Errors are 
clustered at individual level and expressed in parentheses. Signifi-
cance at 1, 5, 10% levels correspond, respectively, to ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗
Dependent variable Pr(employed) Pr(open-
ended 
contract)
ELIG 0.038∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.006)
GROUP1 0.110∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002)
GROUP2 −0.030 −0.018
(0.049) (0.029)
GROUP3 0.119∗∗ 0.004
(0.058) (0.013)
YEAR2 0.075∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002)
YEAR3 0.144∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003)
CONS 0.138∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.005)
Observations 48,888 48,888
Individuals 16,296 16,296
51 (22), p. 3 of 2013/C 120/01.
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leads to flex-‘insecurity’.52Andor and Veselý (2018) themselves acknowledged that 
in some areas of the European Union, young people are likely to be faced with a 
cascade of insecurity in terms of job offers. This would signify that a programme 
such as the Youth Guarantee could only help individuals initially. Findings, instead, 
show that at least some of the participants will not have to worry so soon in terms 
of looking for other job vacancies as their likelihood to be offered an open-ended 
and, thus, a more stable contract increases too. This aspect is particularly relevant 
Table 12  Intention-to-treat 
effect on Pr(employed) and 
Pr(open-ended contract) for 
individuals near the eligibility 
cutoff
The data are provided by the Agency of Trento and refer to the 
unemployed individuals registered as such in the Province of Trento 
between 2014 and 2017. The analysis reported in the table looks 
at the probability of the individuals to become employed and to 
be offered an open-ended contract based to their eligibility status, 
depending on their group of membership. The analysis is done for 
individuals observed near the cutoff; namely, individuals between 
28 and 31. Group 1 represents individuals who are always eligible 
in the time periods considered; group 2 represents individuals who 
are always eligible in the time periods considered except for the last 
year; group 3 represents individuals who are never eligible in the 
time periods considered except for the first year; group 4 represents 
individuals who are never eligible in the time periods considered. 
The year of reference is 2015 and the group of comparison is group 
4. Errors are clustered at individual level and expressed in parenthe-
ses. Significance at 1, 5, 10% levels correspond, respectively, to ∗∗∗ , 
∗∗ , and ∗
Dependent variable Pr(employed) Pr(open-
ended 
contract)
ELIG 0.084∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.012)
GROUP1 0.103∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.006)
GROUP2 −0.024 −0.014
(0.039) (0.022)
GROUP3 0.262 0.001
(0.218) (0.013)
YEAR2 0.072∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.006)
YEAR3 0.132∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.007)
CONS 0.055 0.015
(0.040) (0.021)
Observations 11,712 11,712
Individuals 6418 6418
52 See Berton et al. (2009).
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with respect to the sustainable integration53 of these inactive individuals into the 
labour market. Had there been no Youth Guarantee, the majority of these young 
individuals who are distant from the labour market would probably still use their 
time to remain inactive. Findings support the idea by Heckman (2000) that early 
investments encourage later investments; namely, that efficiency is enhanced when 
human capital is invested in the young.54 In this regard, it is also possible to hypoth-
esise that the policy could have a long-term effect as ‘skills beget skills’ and due to 
their age, NEETs have a longer horizon at disposal ‘over which to recoup the fruits 
of their investments’.55
In respect to the outcomes of interest, due to lack of data, in this paper we focused 
on employment as a valid alternative to inactivity, while we disregarded other activi-
ties such as going back to school or enrolling in a university programme. Thus, there 
could be a certain proportion of individuals whose inactivity observed in occupa-
tional terms corresponds instead to educational activity. According to national sta-
tistics (Istat), in 2014, among the individuals aged between 18 and 24 years who left 
school prematurely, only 8.5% were observed in the province of Trento. In the over-
15 cohort of 2015, 14% had either no educational title or had only finished elemen-
tary school, 30% got a middle-school school-leaving qualification, 14.4% obtained a 
professional diploma, 27.7% a high-school diploma, but only 13.7% obtained a uni-
versity degree. The trend persists in 2016 and 2017 and, indeed, suggests that some 
of the individuals might have enrolled in a university course soon after. In parallel, 
in 2017, 69.5% of the individuals aged between 25 and 44 years without a degree, 
were little satisfied with their current job, so that they may have decided to apply 
for a university course later on. Nevertheless, the intention of the Youth Guarantee 
is to fight a type of inactivity that is mainly related to the labour market. As former 
members of the European Commission, Andor and Veselý (2018) highlighted that 
the Youth Guarantee is about creating a set of interventions that aim to ‘increase 
young people’s aptitude for work, strengthen employers demand for their labour as 
well as [improve] the process of matching young people with available opportuni-
ties’.56 Hence, the main focus of this European policy is to help young people find 
quality job opportunities rather than incentivise them to go back to their studies. 
The inactivity, therefore, is likely to be defined in terms of non participation in the 
labour market. This is also supported by the fact that the leaders of the European 
Union first debated over the question with labour ministers, rather than ministers of 
education, consulted at a later stage, and that the Youth Guarantee itself was born 
to overcome the human capital loss originated from the most recent economic cri-
sis.57 In the same study, Andor and Veselý (2018) also stressed that what should be 
expected from this Youth Guarantee is a European benefit that is fundamentally eco-
nomic, in addition to being social. In this respect, we also studied the characteristic 
53 See Andor and Veselý (2018).
54 See Heckman (2000), pp. 7, 42.
55 Ibid., p. 42.
56 See Andor and Veselý (2018), p. 5.
57 Ibid., pp. 7–8.
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of employability, reflected in the offer of open-ended contracts and, thus, the job 
quality that NEETs face in the labour market. The latter, in particular, supports the 
more urgent necessity of a sustainable integration in the labour markets required by 
the European Union.
As regards the magnitude of the impact of the Youth Guarantee in occupational 
terms, there may be individuals who started working informally in the market and 
that, therefore, are not present in the official statistics. Activities such as babysitting, 
cooking, producing hand-made products at home, or agricultural activities are often 
not declared, as well as services provided in the restaurants. In 2015, the black mar-
ket’s value amounted to 12.6% of the Italian GDP. Among the predominant activi-
ties, 37.3% of the added value was due to irregular work.58 In the province of Trento 
alone, 23.2% of the employees aged between 15 and 29 years are supposed to have 
worked in restaurants and hotels. Although this is an issue observed in most policy 
evaluations, this suggests that there may be more individuals whose labour is not 
officially declared by their employers and, therefore, not observed.
6.2  Robustness checks
In this section we discuss the internal validity of the identification strategy used in 
the previous section. First, we produce difference-in-differences estimates manu-
ally in order to see whether results coincide. Second, we study the intention-to-treat 
effect for individuals who are near the eligibility cutoff and, therefore, very similar. 
Third, we prove that findings are robust to group-specific trends that would be there 
in spite of the programme. Fourth, we study potential time-varying effects. Finally, 
we also present an identification strategy that accounts for the measure of risk of 
remaining a NEET as regards the participants of the Youth Guarantee. If the parallel 
trends assumption holds, the indicator of profiling should not have any significant 
impact on the labour outcomes studied when interacted with participation.
As regards the impact of the policy on the labour outcomes of the individuals 
registered at the Agency of Labour, we estimate the following demeaned regression.
where
(7)Yic = 훼i + 휆PARTICic +
3∑
g=1
훽gCOHgc +
2017∑
p=2016
훾pYEARp + K
�
ic
훽 + 휂ic,
(8)K
�
ic
=휃f FEMALEic +
8∑
r=1
휃rREGr,ic
58 Istat report “L’Economia Non Osservata Nei Conti Nazionali” (11 October 2017).
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In this identification FEMALEic indicates a dummy that is equal to 1 when the can-
didate is a woman. REGr,ic are dummy variables for the macro-region of origin of 
the individuals in the different cohorts, with the U.S. being the reference category, 
while 휃r,s accounts for differences between males and females in their macro-regions 
of origin, where labour market conditions are expected to differ. Results show that 
after having computed the individual averages in the different cohorts, exploiting 
the deviations from the means guarantees that the unobserved individual effects are 
removed, or absorbed.59 Manual estimates suggest, as they should, the same results 
as if we were treating the group effects as parameters such as in equation (1). Over 
time, individuals who participate are 7.4 and 4.4 percentage points more likely to, 
respectively, become employed and be offered an open-ended contract.
As a robustness check that aims to exploit the balance obtained from original ran-
domisation, we study the intention-to-treat effect for individuals who are near the 
eligibility cutoff; namely, individuals who are between 28 and 31 years old. The esti-
mation is carried out in order to only include extremely similar individuals. Results 
from (10), restricted to the aforementioned sample, show that a comparative advan-
tage can also be observed for eligible individuals who are 28 and 29 years old com-
pared to non-eligible individuals who are 30 and 31 years old. Eligibles are, indeed, 
8.4 and 4.2 percentage points more likely to, respectively, become employed and be 
offered an open-ended contract. Results are significant at the 1% level as shown in 
Table 12.
As previously mentioned, there may exist some trends that would characterise cer-
tain cohorts despite the existence of a certain policy. For this reason, we also esti-
mate the equation that follows, which accounts for group-specific trends. In
COHgc × YEARpt represents the group-specific trends, or the variations from the 
common trend that would be present in absence of treatment. Table 13, in particular, 
(9)
Yict − Yic =휆(PARTICict − PARTICic) +
2017∑
p=2016
훾p(YEARpt − YEARp)+
+ (K
�
ic
− K�
ic
)훽 + (휂ict − 휂ic)
(10)Yict = 훼ic + 휔DDELIGict +
3∑
g=1
훽gCOHgc +
2017∑
p=2016
훾pYEARpt + 휂ict,
(11)
Yict = 훼ic + 휆DDPARTICict +
3∑
g=1
훽gCOHgc +
2017∑
p=2016
훾pYEARpt
+
3∑
g=1
2017∑
p=2016
휔gpCOHgc × YEARpt + 휂ict,
59 See Angrist and Pischke (2008).
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Table 13  Difference-in-
differences estimate of the effect 
of participation in the Youth 
Guarantee on Pr(employed) and 
Pr(open-ended contract) with 
group-specific trends
The data are provided by the Agency of Trento and refer to the 
unemployed individuals registered as such in the Province of Trento 
between 2014 and 2017. The analysis reported in the table looks 
at the probability of the individuals to become employed and to 
be offered an open-ended contract based to their treatment status, 
depending on their group of membership. It also takes into account 
group-specific trends. Group 1 represents individuals who are always 
eligible in the time periods considered; group 2 represents individu-
als who are always eligible in the time periods considered except 
for the last year; group 3 represents individuals who are never eli-
gible in the time periods considered except for the first year; group 
4 represents individuals who are never eligible in the time periods 
considered. The year of reference is 2015 and the group of compari-
son is group 4. Errors are clustered at individual level and expressed 
in parentheses. Significance at 1, 5, 10% levels correspond, respec-
tively, to ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗
Dependent variable Pr(employed) Pr(open-
ended 
contract)
PARTIC 0.092∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.005)
GROUP1 0.026∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.008) (0.005)
GROUP2 0.031∗∗ 0.018∗
(0.014) (0.010)
GROUP3 0.024∗ 0.014
(0.014) (0.010)
YEAR2 0.020∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.004)
YEAR3 0.103∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004)
GROUP1 × YEAR2 0.020∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗
(0.008) (0.005)
GROUP1 × YEAR3 0.069∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.005)
GROUP2 × YEAR2 0.000 −0.007
(0.014) (0.010)
GROUP2 × YEAR3 −0.009 −0.003
(0.014) (0.010)
GROUP3 × YEAR2 −0.003 −0.011
(0.015) (0.010)
GROUP3 × YEAR3 0.017 −0.013
(0.015) (0.010)
CONS 0.197∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004)
Observations 48,888 48,888
Individuals 16,296 16,296
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shows that the effect of treatment is not particularly sensitive to the alternative 
model that includes group-specific trends. This is true for both outcomes of interest; 
namely, becoming employed and being offered an open-ended contract. Including 
group-specific trends keeps the treatment coefficients significant, with a slight vari-
ation in their magnitude. Individuals who take part in the internship offered in the 
Youth Guarantee policy are 9.2 and 4.7 percentage points more likely to, respec-
tively, become employed and be offered a permanent position once group-specific 
trends are accounted for.
We also find that there are some particularly relevant time-varying effects. 
Indeed, when we introduce the lag PARTICic,t−1 of the original treatment dummy in 
Table 14  Time-varying effects 
of participation in the Youth 
Guarantee on Pr(employed) and 
Pr(open-ended contract)
The data are provided by the Agency of Trento and refer to the 
unemployed individuals registered as such in the Province of Trento 
between 2014 and 2017. The analysis reported in the table looks at 
the time-varying effects of treatment by adding the lag of the treat-
ment dummy. It does so by considering 4 defined groups. Group 1 
represents individuals who are always eligible in the time periods 
considered; group 2 represents individuals who are always eligible 
in the time periods considered except for the last year; group 3 rep-
resents individuals who are never eligible in the time periods consid-
ered except for the first year; group 4 represents individuals who are 
never eligible in the time periods considered. The year of reference 
is 2015 and the group of comparison is group 4. Errors are clustered 
at individual level and expressed in parentheses. Significance at 1, 5, 
10% levels correspond, respectively, to ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗
Dependent variable Pr(employed) Pr(open-
ended 
contract)
PARTIC 0.082∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.007)
PARTICt−1 0.017∗ −0.037∗∗
(0.010) (0.007)
GROUP1 0.107∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.011)
GROUP2 −0.037 −0.014
(0.056) (0.030)
GROUP3 0.122∗∗ 0.007
(0.056) (0.020)
YEAR2 0.067∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002)
YEAR3 0.135∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003)
CONS 0.159∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006)
Observations 48,888 48,888
Individuals 16,296 16,296
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the model, findings on 휆lag suggest that the Youth Guarantee produces larger effects 
over time as regards the likelihood of the individuals to become employed.
Table  14 shows, indeed, that the policy guarantees an additional 1.7 percentage 
points benefit 1 year after its adoption in terms of starting a job. On the other hand, 
the initial effect of the programme dissipates over time by 3.7 percentage points 
as regards the chances of the individuals to be offered an open-ended contract. In 
other words, 1 year after the implementation of the training programme, individu-
als are 3.7 percentage points less likely to be offered an open-ended contract. This 
is in line with the idea that the best jobs and, thus, the offers of permanent con-
tracts are exhausted faster. In an atmosphere of fierce occupational competition 
among job seekers, the institutional context of the Italian labour market is not able 
to offer a wide number of open-ended contracts to young potentially new work-
ers. As explained in Sect. 3, financial incentives for firms have usually been used 
to transform the contracts of individuals already employed by their firm; namely, 
insiders or workers of the older cohorts. As a consequence, young individuals who 
settle for atypical contracts, including part-time or fixed-term jobs, right after having 
participated in and completed the training programme with difficulty will be able 
to fill in the scarce open-ended positions, as these will already have been offered to 
their more skilled or advantageous colleagues. In particular, when analysing specific 
individuals who were not offered an open-ended contract, we see that while there no 
significant difference was observed between female (45.1%) and male (54.9%) can-
didates, a comparative disadvantage was observed for individuals whose nationality 
was registered as Southern European. As regards participation in and eligibility to 
the training programme, 79.7% and 66.1% of, respectively, participating and eligible 
European subjects from the South were not offered an open-ended contract.
As regards the alternative test for parallel trends, we account for the individu-
als’ profiling. This is an indicator that is computed statistically and is based on 
individual characteristics such as the individual’s presence in Italy, her level 
of education, or her previous work experience (see “Appendix”). The indicator 
ranges from 0 to 1. Lower values of the profiling indicator express a higher prob-
ability for the individual to be reinstated in the labour market. Vice versa, higher 
values of the profiling indicator signal that the individual is likely to remain a 
NEET. In particular, a youth’s profiling indicator is low if its value falls between 
0.000 and 0.250000; medium if the latter falls between 0.250001 and 0.50000; 
high if its value falls between 0.50001 and 0.750000; and finally, very high if 
the value of the indicator falls between 0.750001 and 1. A series of interactions 
PARTICict × LOWict , PARTICict ×MEDIUMict , and PARTICict × VHIGHict are cre-
ated for the four different types of profiling. The high profiling dummy is used as 
the base category. Given that profiling accounts for personal characteristics and 
talents, the indicator is likely to explain part of the variation in the occupational 
(12)
Yict = 훼ic + 휆DDPARTICict + 휆lagPARTICic,t−1
+
3∑
g=1
훽gCOHgc +
2017∑
p=2016
훾pYEARpt + 휂ict
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prospects of the individuals (see “Appendix”). Nevertheless, its effect should not 
be significantly different from 0 when combined with participation in the pro-
gramme itself. Given that only participants are assessed with a profiling, we ran-
domly assign a type of profiling to each individual every year so as not to produce 
over- or under-estimations.
Results in Table 15 confirm, as they should, that participation increases the likeli-
hood of NEETs to become employed and to be offered an open-ended contract by, 
respectively, 6.6 and 3.8 percentage points. On the other hand, the impact of their 
profiling PROFi is irrelevant when combined with treatment. This contributes to 
supporting the assumption of parallel trends for it suggests that the Youth Guaran-
tee works independent of the type of individuals who join the programme and that 
results are not driven by a certain type of individual. The negligible difference with 
the main identification strategy (1), which does not include the interaction terms of 
profiling, indicates that profiling is unlikely to significantly influence the probability 
of individuals to become employed or to be offered an open-ended contract when 
participants and non participants are compared. Further evidence of the effective-
ness of the policy, independent of the profiling assessed for each individual, can be 
found in the “Appendix”. As explained in the “Appendix”, individuals who have a 
high profiling, or a high probability to remain occupationally inactive based on their 
educational and employment histories, may experience social stigma and emotional 
unrest at the idea of ‘needing’ training to a larger extent compared to the other job 
seekers in order to find a job. When faced with a job interview, the quality of skills 
acquired in school or at University, as well as the existing job experience, are likely 
to play a role in being offered employment. Nevertheless, from a causal point of 
view, findings in Table 15 show that, when participating and non-participating indi-
viduals are compared in their likelihood to become employed and to be offered an 
open-ended contract, profiling does not have an economically significant effect con-
trary to participation.
7  Conclusions
Young generations of this era are often subject to the instability of short-term jobs 
and have to search for new ones as soon as their contract ends. As labour markets 
change, training is needed to guarantee effective transitions from unemployment to 
employment and from part-time to permanent employment. When individuals lose 
(13)
Yict = 훼ic + 휆DDPARTICict + 휆lowPARTICict
× LOWict + 휆mediumPARTICict ×MEDIUMict
+ 휆vhighPARTICict × VHIGHict +
3∑
m=1
휃m,sPROFm,ict +
3∑
g=1
훽gCOHgc
+
2017∑
p=2016
훾pYEARpt + 휂ict
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Table 15  Effects of participation 
and profiling in the Youth 
Guarantee on Pr(employed) and 
Pr(open-ended contract)
The data are provided by the Agency of Trento and refer to the 
unemployed individuals registered as such in the Province of Trento 
between 2014 and 2017. The analysis reported in the table looks at 
the potential impact of the individual characteristic of profiling on 
the labour outcomes studied. The profiling is computed statistically 
based on individual characteristics such as the individual’s presence 
in Italy, her level of education, or her previous work experience. The 
indicator ranges from 0 to 1. Lower values of the profiling indicate 
a higher probability for the individual to exit from her NEET condi-
tion. A youth’s profiling indicator is LOW if it falls between 0.000 
and 0.250000; MEDIUM if it falls between 0.250001 and 0.50000; 
HIGH if it falls between 0.50001 and 0.750000; and finally, VHIGH 
if the indicator falls between 0.750001 and 1. Profiling is randomly 
assigned to individuals every year so as not to bias estimates. A series 
of interactions are created for the four different types of profiling and 
participation. High profiling is used as the base category. Errors are 
clustered at individual level and expressed in parentheses. Signifi-
cance at 1, 5, 10% levels correspond, respectively, to ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗
Dependent variable     Pr(employed) Pr(open-
ended 
contract)
PARTIC 0.066∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗
(0.018) (0.012)
PARTIC × LOW −0.001 0.008
(0.025) (0.017)
PARTIC ×MEDIUM −0.003 −0.009
(0.025) (0.017)
PARTIC × VHIGH 0.037 0.029
(0.025) (0.018)
LOW 0.005 0.004
(0.005) (0.003)
MEDIUM −0.000 0.003
(0.005) (0.004)
VHIGH 0.006 0.004
(0.005) (0.003)
GROUP1 0.114∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.008)
GROUP2 −0.034 0-−0.021
(0.056) (0.034)
GROUP3 0.122∗∗ 0.007
(0.056) (0.020)
YEAR2 0.067∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002)
YEAR3 0.134∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003)
CONS 0.154∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.005)
Observations 48,888 48,888
Individuals 16,296 16,296
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their marketable skills by becoming inactive, it becomes increasingly difficult for a 
labour market transition to be successful. The Youth Guarantee was recommended 
by the European Union precisely to help vulnerable individuals such as NEETs 
escape from their condition of complete inactivity. This paper, in particular, investi-
gated the impact of the widespread programme A of the Youth Guarantee in North-
ern Italy. The analysis questioned whether participation in the programme increased 
not only the probability to become employed, but also the individual’s chance to 
start a stable work relationship. Exploiting a difference-in-differences model, results 
show that on-the-job training preceded by profiling assessment succeeds in making 
individuals occupationally active. Participants are, respectively, 7.4 and 4.4 percent-
age points more likely to become employed and be offered an open-ended contract. 
The analysis, therefore, suggests that an active labour market policy such as the 
internship promoted within the framework of the Youth Guarantee can actually help 
individuals overcome their condition of exclusion from the labour market not only 
by providing them with a job, but also by succeeding in the promotion of quality 
employment through permanent contracts. In other words, the policy appears to be 
effective in terms of integration of individuals otherwise isolated from the labour 
market and, thus, at risk of deterioration of human capital.
Reasons for explaining these positive results may find support, firstly, in the 
nature of the active labour market policy studied,60 which is specifically designed to 
upgrade the skills of the individuals involved; secondly, in local authorities having 
at their disposal specific guidelines from the European Union that may have helped 
them grasp the final objective of the policy; thirdly, in the quality of the training 
offered at the selected firms; and, fourthly, in the target of the policy itself. The posi-
tive results by Cappellini et al. (2018) for the youth population in Central Italy also 
support the effectiveness of such a programme. Despite the fact that training is, with 
certainty, the more expensive measure within active labour market policies, it also 
appears to produce significant benefits for the development of the younger popula-
tion. The programme evaluated, for instance, represents a good compromise between 
theory and practice. On the one hand, the period of formation and orientation that is 
common to all candidates introduces, or reintroduces, the individuals to the reality 
of the labour market. On the other hand, the training at the selected firms encourages 
individuals to interact with experts; acquire new skills; and put them into practice. It 
also helps them to better direct their future work preferences.
On this subject, the implementation of similar programmes could potentially lead 
to a structural change in the way individuals transition from educational environ-
ments to permanent workplaces. In particular, the latter could promote an approach 
that is similar to the dual educational system typical of Continental Europe. Active 
labour market policies may not always be effective for the older population. How-
ever, they appear to be successful when they focus on the potential stock of com-
petencies of the individuals and when they have a specific target such as NEETs. 
The latter aspect is relevant in that it contributes to reinforcing the theory according 
to which the more individuals are distant from the reality of the labour market the 
60 Namely, training.
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greater the impact of ALMPs on them. Spending on active measures that focus on 
the training and job placement of the younger segment of the population, as well as 
efficiency in the use of the available funds, still varies across regions (see Table 5 in 
Sect. 3). Similarly, Italy has converged to an active labour market approach in the 
law that aims to obstruct the ‘secession of the successful’ only recently. Both facts 
imply that results from the Youth Guarantee can still be ameliorated by local institu-
tions, including the Agency of Labour of Trento. However, the positive findings for 
the on-the-job training analysed in this study are likely to encourage inactive indi-
viduals to ask for assistance in the job centres of reference for finding employment. 
Similarly, the Province of Trento is likely to keep spending in training programmes 
able to upgrade the skills of occupationally inactive participants so as for the figures 
on youth unemployment to progressively resemble that observed in Austria or simi-
lar neighbouring countries. The success in guaranteeing not only a job but a per-
manent occupation to participants will presumably incentivise local, national, and 
international lawmakers to submit proposals for increasing the size and frequency 
of financial incentives for public and private firms, such as an employment bonuses, 
to hire individuals treated in the Youth Guarantee. All in all, the Youth Guarantee in 
the Province of Trento should continue to be designed as an opportunity for occu-
pationally inactive individuals to be provided with an advantageous means to both 
employment and permanent occupation.
Unfortunately, owing to the lack of data we could not assess whether participa-
tion in the programme also induced an increase in participation in some other kind 
of educational programme. Official statistics for the Province of Trento, however, 
show that only a very small proportion of individuals left school once enrolled in 
an educational cycle. Hence, it is probable that no major effects of the programme 
are concentrated there. Keeping track of the NEET individuals both from an occu-
pational and educational perspective could still be useful. A simple questionnaire 
would help distinguish whether the occupational inactivity of some of the indi-
viduals who did not become employed also corresponds to an educational inactiv-
ity. Notwithstanding, and as stressed by renowned members of the European Union 
Commission in respect to the Youth Guarantee, most of the efforts should be made 
to aid individuals in finding opportunities in the labour market.61 On this subject, 
when the effect of participation in the training programme offered within the Youth 
Guarantee context is positive, this can be an indication for individuals who are not 
interested in pursuing their studies, such as dropouts, of the possibility to acquire 
specialised skills and apply them in the real world of work. As argued by Heckman 
(2000), learning often occurs in settings outside the standard institutions of educa-
tion. With their rewarding results, the Province of Trento and other Italian regions 
such as Tuscany, where the Youth Guarantee is successful, can finally overcome 
the traditional Italian conception of theoretical education being always more fruit-
ful than practical knowledge. With the Youth Guarantee, training programmes can 
become the ultimate European door openers for the new generations of occupation-
ally inactive individuals.
61 See Andor and Veselý (2018).
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Due to their similar approach to both social assistance and youth inactivity, find-
ings related to the likelihood of individuals to find a job in this area of Northern 
Italy may be of relevance for other European regions.62 On the other hand, while the 
historical and social nature of the country makes it difficult to draw conclusions for 
Italy as a whole, the paper sheds light on the new opportunities created for the young 
population in terms of job stability. It demonstrates that even in a country where ‘old 
is gold’ prospects for the young people can actually change and that there can be 
more than a mere acceptance of flexinsecurity. The relevance of the study is, there-
fore, twofold in terms of geographical areas exposed to the issue. With respect to 
job instability, the training programme provided by the Youth Guarantee represents 
one step forward in respect to the issue of selective flexicurity, in that it increases 
the chances of young people to be offered an open-ended and, thus, a more stable 
contract. In this regard, the paper highlights the necessity for international policy 
makers to guide countries like Italy in the development of a healthy combination of 
flexibility and security in the labour market. Experts at the European Union institu-
tions, in particular, should monitor thoroughly the distribution of contracts in the 
Italian labour market in terms of both the types of contract offered and the recipients 
of the contracts so as to avoid an unwanted retrogression. As mentioned in Sect. 3, 
the Italian labour market has generally been in favour of insiders such as the older 
cohorts of employees and of passive labour market policies such as monetary ben-
efits. This study, however, shows how the recent Europeanisation of labour market 
policies succeeded in creating a valid point of departure for the Italian labour market 
in terms of giving value to young workers. Findings, in particular, emphasise the 
capability of Northern Italy to implement on-the-job training experiences under the 
guidance of the European Union in terms of both employment and employability. As 
regards policy recommendations, it would be advisable to give greater weight to the 
opinions of the European Committee of the Regions (CoR) that is consulted by the 
Commission, Council, and Parliament in the field of employment. In respect to this, 
it would be interesting to further explore the role of the local unions of workers and 
associations of employers so as to understand if the latter are willing to cooperate 
with the government and adapt to the new and European ‘active’ approach to unem-
ployment. A recent report by the European Commission Expert Group (2016) found 
an exaggerated number of city commitments to invest in technological innovation 
for improving both domestic and international markets, as well as facilitate reskill-
ing. ‘Experience-sharing mechanisms’ across regions, as well as subsidiarity among 
institutions, are fundamental to achieve a European Union model of youth employ-
ment services that are implemented at the local level. The increase in consultations 
between Ministries, the National Agency for Active Labour Market Policies, and 
the local Agencies of Labour registered in Italian labour law shows that increasing 
attention is given to the vulnerable segments of the population, including not only 
females, but also young inactive subjects (see Sect. 3).
Overall, the findings suggest that the European Union should keep investing in 
training and further promote it when individuals are willing to learn new skills and 
62 For instance, Austria.
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invest in them.63 They also invite policy makers to focus on outreach strategies for 
all those NEETs who did not apply to the Youth Guarantee in order to increase the 
overall impact of the policy. In this regard, it would be useful to investigate whether 
individuals avoid participation in response to certain social expectations. Due to 
their malleability in practical skills, the Youth Guarantee certainly has the poten-
tial to provide young individuals with higher economic prospects. However, it also 
offers them a social context that is recognised at the European level and in which to 
develop a professional and social identity. In particular, policy makers should design 
and implement training programmes like the ones promoted by the Youth Guarantee 
so as to include the largest number of participants. Studies by Albert et al. (2013) 
and Sanfey et  al. (2014) show, respectively, young individuals are more sensitive 
to the effect of social stimuli in risky contexts and social sanctions are sometimes 
more effective in influencing individual behaviour than monetary sanctions. Thus, 
many occupationally inactive individuals may fail to participate in training pro-
grammes due to the effect of their subculture of reference and the threat of social 
exclusion that may derive from participation. When providing incentives for par-
ticipation, policy makers should also account for the the social implications behind 
participation in active measures. In addition to financing programmes of awareness 
on the Youth Guarantee in schools, Universities, and other centres of education to 
inform non participants about the content and effectiveness of training, policy mak-
ers should also offer incentives that reach both potential participants and their occu-
pationally inactive peers. Understandably, unemployed youths do not only seek a job 
or financial stability in their transition from school to work or from unemployment 
to employment, but they reasonably seek social inclusion too. The Youth Guarantee 
may appease both urgencies.
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Appendix
Profiling and the Youth Guarantee
On the occasion of signing the service pact with the job centre of reference, indi-
viduals are ‘profiled’ according to their degree of risk of remaining inactive. The 
indicator of profiling is computed statistically for each youth and is considered 
itself an active labour market policy (ALMP). The profiling is based on a series 
of individual characteristics such as the individual’s presence in Italy; her level 
63 With reference to Heckman (2000), it is recommended to invest in the highly skilled, tax them, and 
provide older and unskilled workers with alternative measures of welfare, such as wage subsidies, so as 
to avoid ineffective training.
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of education; her situation of employment 1  year before the start of the Youth 
Guarantee; and other local features including entrepreneurial density and varia-
tion in the unemployment rate of the area of origin. The indicator ranges from 
0 to 1. Lower and higher values of the profiling indicator signal, respectively, a 
higher and lower probability for the individual to be reintegrated in the labour 
market. A youth’s profiling indicator is low if its value falls between 0.000 and 
0.250000; medium if it falls between 0.250001 and 0.50000; high if it falls 
between 0.50001 and 0.750000; and finally, very high if the indicator’s value falls 
between 0.750001 and 1.
While participation in ALMPs may or may not have beneficial effects for par-
ticipants, the threat caused by their mere existence may have an impact on the 
occupational prospects of the individuals involved. The study by Black et  al. 
(2003), for instance, examined the consequences of profiling on unemployment 
insurance claimants. In particular, they found that the former reduced both the 
number of weeks of benefit receipt and the amount received. At the same time, the 
activity led to a significant increase in earnings for the treated individuals in the 
year after their claim for unemployment benefits, suggesting an anticipated entry 
in the labour market. Similar results were observed by Bergemann et  al. (2008, 
2011) for Germany and by Blasco and Rosholm (2011) for Denmark. Scholars 
agree on the fact that systems that guarantee active labour market policies usually 
increase the effort in job search so as to avoid actual participation in ALMPs. On 
this subject, there might be valid reasons for individuals to be significantly influ-
enced by the presence of ALMPs in their labour market. Heckman and Rubinstein 
(2001), for instance, associated this threat effect to the fear of having to renounce 
alternative activities or of being stigmatised. As a result, individuals may accept 
non-quality jobs rather than attend active measures that demand a long-term com-
mitment. The fear of producing a negative signal to external subjects such as 
potential employers has been widely discussed in the literature. Spence (1973), 
before all, defined the job market as a market where signaling is paramount, due 
to the lack of information on job candidates. On the one hand, the employer lacks 
the necessary knowledge about the real skills of the job candidates. On the other 
hand, the individuals have to select the information they aim to signal at a certain 
cost. This is particularly true for the more disadvantaged subjects who compete 
with better educated and, sometimes, more productive individuals. As observed 
by Connelly and Certo (2011), inferior signalers may take the risk of producing 
false signals, or cheat, for they are aware of their chances being lower anyway. In 
this regard, Hopkins (2012) shed light on the stronger signals sent by high-quality 
workers to firms. This would explain the different degree of difficulty for low- and 
high-profiled individuals to get a job in the first place.
A comparison between individuals who are and who are not profiled would be 
more useful in order to identify the potential ex-ante effect of profiling in the Youth 
Guarantee. On this occasion, however, we will present an analysis that focuses 
exclusively on the participants of the Youth Guarantee. This allows us to exploit 
the information relevant for the individuals on their profiling and the duration of 
their training in the selected firms. In particular, we aim to investigate how the dif-
ferent types of profiling indicators with which NEETs are assessed influence their 
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job opportunities. For the purpose of this analysis, we retain only those individu-
als who participate in the programme of the Youth Guarantee and, thus, who are 
profiled before starting their on-the-job training experience. The Youth Guarantee 
expects participants not to be engaged in employment, education, or training, and 
to be younger than 30 years old. In order not to produce biased estimates, associ-
ated to the duration of training, individuals who are still participating and who have 
2100 as their year end date are dropped. As regards the most relevant controls, we 
account for the nationality of the participating individuals, their age, and their gen-
der. A dummy ITi for whether the individual observed is Italian or not is included 
in the model. Indeed, in contrast to Northern countries like Denmark or the Neth-
erlands, job vacancies in the Italian labour market are likely to require candidates 
to have a perfect knowledge of the Italian language. To verify this, it is sufficient 
to check some of the job offers promoted online by Italian firms or the number of 
blogs that provide suggestions for foreigners on what actions to take in order to find 
a job in Italy. With regard to the average age of the labour force in Italy, the fact that 
there is a tendency on the part of individuals to live with their parents long after 
reaching their majority, developed a labour market where firms are used to older 
candidates. Recent statistics by Eurostat show that the average age at which Italians 
left their family nest in 2017 was about 30.1 years old, in comparison with Germans 
and Swedes who moved out at, respectively, 23.7 and 21. This justifies the need to 
consider the individuals’ AGEi as well. Because of the traditional history of female 
discrimination in the Italian labour market, we also account for a dummy FEMALEi . 
On this subject, the use of illegal undated letters of resignation that employers 
obliged female employees to sign, so as to prevent the costs of maternity leave, only 
stopped recently, with the 2014–2015 Jobs Act.
In this analysis, we are particularly interested in investigating whether the pro-
filing of an individual can actually influence employers when opting for a candi-
date rather than for another one. Additionally, we are curious about understanding 
whether attending the programme for a longer duration can work as a remedial 
to the potential ‘stigma’ brought by the initial assessment of the individual. The 
longer a disadvantaged youth attends the programme, the more likely it could be 
for her to acquire and develop any lacking skill or, vice versa, to fall victim to 
potential locking-in effects. Using standard OLS, we first look at the association 
of the different types of profiling PROFi with the two labour outcomes of inter-
est Yi ; namely, the likelihood of the participants to become employed and to be 
offered an open-ended contract. In particular, we include the LOWi , MEDIUMi , 
and VHIGHi dummies for having, respectively, a low, medium, and very high pro-
filing and use the dummy of high profiling as the base category. We then incorpo-
rate DURi in the model, or the duration of the internship measured in intervals of 
100 days, to see whether there exists any compensation for having a particularly 
risky profile. A stronger commitment in the programme, or simply more time, 
may help the more vulnerable individuals overcome their occupational prospects. 
A distinction is made between short, medium, and long terms since the imple-
mentation of the Youth Guarantee, intended as the years 2015, 2016, and 2017.
 European Journal of Law and Economics
1 3
The descriptive statistics of Table  16 show that individuals are on average about 
24.2 years old, with male participants being slightly younger. As regards the nation-
ality of participating individuals, Italians make up the majority of the sample ana-
lysed. NEETs participate in the on-the-job training for 324 days averagely, with a 
variation of less than 2 months. In respect to the profiling, we observe that 21.8% 
of the individuals are assessed with a low profiling; 29.3% with a medium profil-
ing; 32.7% with a high profiling; and 16.3% with a very high profiling. In particular, 
individuals who are at a low risk of staying unemployed are 25.1 years old on aver-
age, while NEETs with a high profiling are usually 23.1 years old. Conversely, there 
is no particular pattern when trying to understand the relationship between the type 
(14)Yi = 훼 + 훽AGEi + 휃f FEMALEi + 훿ITi +
3∑
m=1
휃pPROFm,i + 휔DURi + 휖i
Table 16  Descriptive statistics 
for individuals registered at 
Agency of Labour of Trento, 
2014–2017
In this table, we provide descriptive statistics for the main variables 
observed in the data provided by the Agency of Labour of Trento for 
individuals who registered for participation in the Youth Guarantee 
between 2014–2017. For all unemployed individuals in the sample, 
we observe their gender and nationality, which are the subject-spe-
cific qualities of the individuals. For participants we also observe a 
profiling indicator that is computed statistically based on individual 
characteristics such as the individual’s presence in Italy, her level 
of education, or her previous work experience. The indicator ranges 
from 0 to 1. This measure corresponds to the risk of the individual 
to remain unemployed and uneducated. A youth’s profiling indica-
tor is low if it falls between 0.000 and 0.250000; medium if it falls 
between 0.250001 and 0.50000; high if it falls between 0.50001 
and 0.750000; and finally, very high if the indicator falls between 
0.750001 and 1. We also observe for how long individuals attend the 
on-the-job training programme measured in intervals of 100 days.
Variables observed for participants Mean SD
Predetermined covariates
Age (years) 24.17 3.908
Gender ( Female = 1) 0.445 0.497
Italian 0.834 0.373
Determined in Youth Guarantee
Low profiling 0.218 0.413
Medium profiling 0.293 0.455
High profiling 0.327 0.469
Very high profiling 0.163 0.369
Duration of training (100 days) 3.236 0.485
Outcomes of interest
Employed 0.396 0.489
Open-ended contract 0.168 0.374
Observations 9120
Individuals 3040
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of profiling assessed and the gender of the individual. Indeed, women are the minor-
ity in both low- and very high-profiling categories with a proportion of, respectively, 
44.1% and 40.1%. On the contrary, Italians are the predominant nationality in all 
the categories. Indeed, they make up 90% of the low-risk group and 79.9% of the 
high-risk group. As regards participation in the on-the-job training, individuals usu-
ally attend the programme for about 11 months, with low and medium profiles par-
ticipating slightly longer. In terms of the relationship between the occupational pros-
pects of the NEETs and their profiling, there is a moderate contrast between low and 
high profiles. Table 17, in particular, shows that employed NEETs are assessed with 
a low profiling 54.4% of the time and with a very high profiling 31% of the time. 
The gap is also present to a modest degree when looking at the type of individuals 
who are offered an open-ended contract, independent of becoming employed. While 
we only find 12.1% of the NEETs with a very high profiling ending up with an open-
ended contract, the proportion increases up to 26.1% for those assessed with a low 
profiling. 
As regards our identification strategy, the OLS estimates of Table 18 show that 
an increase in age corresponds to an increase in the probability for participants to 
exit from their unemployment condition in both short and medium terms. For Ital-
ian participants, there is an additional comparative advantage in the medium term 
of about 4.3 percentage points, significant at 10% level. The training programme 
appears to be more beneficial for female participants too, compared to their male 
Table 17  Descriptive statistics for individuals registered at Agency of Labour of Trento by profiling, 
2014–2017
In this table, we provide descriptive statistics for the main variables observed in the data provided by 
the Agency of Labour of Trento for individuals who registered for participation in the Youth Guarantee 
between 2014–2017. For all unemployed individuals in the sample, we observe their gender and nation-
ality, which are the subject-specific qualities of the individuals. For participants we also observe a profil-
ing indicator that is computed statistically based on individual characteristics such as the individual’s 
presence in Italy, her level of education, or her previous work experience. A youth’s profiling indicator 
is low if it falls between 0.000 and 0.250000; medium if it falls between 0.250001 and 0.50000; high if 
it falls between 0.50001 and 0.750000; and finally, very high if the indicator falls between 0.750001 and 
1. In this table, descriptive statistics are computed conditional on the type of profiling with which the 
individuals have been assessed at the Agency, distinguishing between low, medium, high, and very high 
profiling.
Variables observed | Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Types of profiling If low If medium If high If very high
Age (years) 25.06 3.435 22.09 3.573 23.07 3.423 23.07 3.423
Gender ( female = 1) 0.441 0.497 0.474 0.499 0.445 0.497 0.401 0.490
Italian 0.900 0.300 0.949 0.219 0.799 0.401 0.605 0.489
Duration training /100d 3.239 0.465 3.245 0.485 3.191 0.520 3.306 0.429
Employed 0.544 0.498 0.418 0.493 0.321 0.467 0.310 0.463
Open-ended contract 0.261 0.439 0.179 0.384 0.121 0.326 0.121 0.326
Observations 1986 2673 2979 1482
Individuals 662 891 993 494
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colleagues.64 At least in the short term, women are 3.6 percentage points more likely 
to become employed. However, no such advantage is observed in the following peri-
ods. This is not particularly surprising given that the phenomenon of undated let-
ters of resignation preventing maternity leave stopped with the 2014–2015 Jobs Act. 
While the latter might help explain the positive change in job opportunities observed 
for women in 2015, it did not guarantee its stability over time. Similarly, the fact 
Table 18  OLS: explaining the 
probability to become employed 
through profiling
The data are provided by the Agency of Trento and refer to the 
unemployed individuals registered as such in the Province of Trento 
between 2014 and 2017. Estimates are obtained from an ordinary-
least-squares regression on 3040 individuals. In this table, we show 
the extent to which covariates explain the probability of participants 
to become employed. The duration of the training is also taken into 
account in intervals of 100 days, given that the majority of partici-
pants attend the programme for more than 4  months. The identifi-
cation also accounts for the different types of profiling of the indi-
viduals, with high profiling as the base category. A youth’s profiling 
indicator is low if it falls between 0.000 and 0.250000; medium if it 
falls between 0.250001 and 0.50000; high if it falls between 0.50001 
and 0.750000; and finally, very high if the indicator falls between 
0.750001 and 1. The variation inflation factor is also estimated, 
with 1
VIF
 in parentheses. Significance at 1, 5, 10% levels correspond, 
respectively, to ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ . Standard errors are expressed in paren-
theses.
Y = Pr(employed) Short 
term
Medium term Long term VIF
AGE 0.015∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.001 1.35
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.74)
FEMALE 0.036∗∗ 0.011 −0.005 1.03
(0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.97)
IT 0.021 0.043∗ 0.031 1.13
(0.022) (0.025) (0.026) (0.88)
DUR 0.009 −0.038∗∗ −0.033∗ 1.01
(0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.99)
LOW 0.249∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 1.70
(0.024) (0.028) (0.028) (0.59)
MEDIUM 0.021∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗ 0.072∗∗ 1.56
(0.021) (0.024) (0.025) (0.64)
VHIGH 0.026 0.010 −0.067∗∗ 1.31
(0.023) (0.027) (0.028) (0.76)
CONS −0.022∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.538∗∗∗ –
(0.072) (0.085) (0.089) –
R-squared 9.3% 3.5% 2.3% –
Observations 3040 3040 3040 –
64 This is line with the studies of Svejnar (2002), Bergemann and van den Berg (2008), and Card et al. 
(2011, 2010).
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that older and Italian job candidates are slightly favoured confirms the hypothesis 
of the existing literature of a labour market in Italy that is used to older employees 
and that prefers compatriot individuals. In regard to our main covariate of interest, 
we are interested in understanding how much of the variation observed in the labour 
outcomes is explained by being assessed with a certain type of profiling. Table 18 
shows that being assessed with a low profiling corresponds to a positive change in 
the probability to be offered a job of, respectively, 24.9, 15.3, and 13.3 percentage 
points in the short, medium, and long terms. Compared to high profiles, a similar 
pattern is also found for individuals assigned with a medium profiling. Having a 
very high profiling, on the other hand, contributes to explaining a negative variation 
in the probability to become employed by 6.7 percentage points in the long term. 
Estimates are similar as regards job stability. Table  19 shows that being assessed 
Table 19  OLS: explaining the probability to be offered an open-ended contract through profiling
The data are provided by the Agency of Trento and refer to the unemployed individuals registered as 
such in the Province of Trento between 2014 and 2017. Estimates are obtained from an ordinary-least-
squares regression on 3040 individuals. In this table, we show the extent to which covariates explain 
the probability of participants to be offered an open-ended contract, independent of becoming employed. 
The duration of the training is also taken into account in intervals of 100 days, given that the majority of 
participants attend the programme for more than four months. The identification also accounts for the 
different types of profiling of the individuals, with high profiling as the base category. A youth’s profiling 
indicator is low if it falls between 0.000 and 0.250000; medium if it falls between 0.250001 and 0.50000; 
high if it falls between 0.50001 and 0.750000; and finally, very high if the indicator falls between 
0.750001 and 1. The variation inflation factor is also estimated, with 1
VIF
 in parentheses. Significance at 
1, 5, 10% levels correspond, respectively, to ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ . Standard errors are expressed in parentheses.
Y = Pr(Open-Ended) Short term Medium term Long term VIF
AGE 0.002 0.002 −0.003 1.35
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.74)
FEMALE 0.035∗∗∗ 0.007 0.001 1.03
(0.010) (0.014) (0.016) (0.97)
IT −0.016 0.035∗ 0.044∗∗ 1.13
(0.014) (0.019) (0.022) (0.88)
DUR −0.006 −0.011 −0.024 1.01
(0.010) (0.014) (0.016) (0.99)
LOW 0.145∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 1.70
(0.016) (0.021) (0.025) (0.59)
MEDIUM 0.029∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 1.56
(0.013) (0.018) (0.021) (0.64)
VHIGH −0.009 0.026 0.001 1.31
(0.015) (0.021) (0.024) (0.76)
CONS 0.028 0.068 0.305∗∗∗ –
(0.047) (0.066) (0.078) –
R-squared 5.1% 2.3% 1.8% –
Observations 3040 3040 3040 –
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with a low or medium profiling indicator contributes to a positive variation in the 
probability of participants to be offered an open-ended contract. In the long term, for 
instance, the change is equal to, respectively, 13.8 and 7.3 percentage points. Results 
seem to suggest a greater difficulty for high profiles to produce positive signals to 
the potential employers in the labour market.
In this regard, we also take into account the possibility for participants to experi-
ence locking-in effects during their internship at the selected firms. Table 18 shows 
that attending the programme at the firm for 100 additional days corresponds to a 
reduction in the probability to become employed of 3.8 and 3.3 percentage points in, 
respectively, the medium and long terms. The latter supports the theory by Cerulli-
Harms (2017) on the risks of becoming ‘eternal interns’. Results do not differ as 
regards the probability of the participants to be offered an open-ended contract. 
Indeed, a longer participation in the programme does not appear to be remedial for 
the candidates. The assignment of a low or medium profiling, on the other hand, 
contributes to explaining part of the positive variation in this labour outcome. How-
ever, and as anticipated by the weak correlation coefficients in Table 20, findings are 
not powerful in terms of the extent to which profiling explains the labour outcomes 
of the individuals.65 The latter is in line with the alternative parallel trends assump-
tion provided in Sect. 6.2 according to which results are not driven by specific pro-
filing types but solely by participation. Nevertheless, individuals who are profiled 
with a certain type of profiling may experience an emotional shock that increases 
awareness on their condition. This would then lead them to accept any job offer 
they receive in line with the idea that the latter is the best they can get anyway. One 
may consider whether individuals fear social stigma with respect to participation 
in active labour market policies or social pressure on the part of their families and 
peers. Further research should investigate the nature of the question.
Table 20  Correlation matrix for labour outcomes and profiling
The data are provided by the Agency of Trento and refer to the unemployed individuals registered as 
such in the Province of Trento between 2014 and 2017. A correlation matrix is presented so as to under-
stand the relationship between the labour outcomes of interest and the covariates, including the type of 
profiling with which the participants are assessed. A youth’s profiling indicator is low if it falls between 
0.000 and 0.250000; medium if it falls between 0.250001 and 0.50000; high if it falls between 0.50001 
and 0.750000; and finally, very high if the indicator falls between 0.750001 and 1.
Outcome of interest Pr(employed) Pr(open-ended)
Age (years) + 0.184 + 0.109
Gender ( Female = 1) + 0.027 + 0.023
Italian + 0.056 + 0.049
Duration training /100d − 0.017 − 0.016
Low profiling + 0.160 + 0.130
Medium profiling + 0.028 + 0.019
Very high profiling − 0.078 − 0.124
65 R2 goes from 9.3% in the short term to 2.3% in the long term as regards the probability to become 
employed and from 5.1% to 1.8% as regards the probability to be offered an open-ended contract.
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